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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
TO JUDGMENTS AND PUBLIC ACTS 
A HISTORICAL-ANALYTICAL REAPPRAISAL* 
Kurt H. Nadelmannt 
IN our federal system, functions of extreme practical importance appertain to the Full Faith and Credit clause under which 
comity can become a constitutional command for certain aspects 
of interstate relations. Recent action by Congress under the part 
of the clause which relates to "public acts," as well as the Supreme 
Court's vacillations in the same area since early in this century 
have emphasized the uncertainties which surround the full faith 
command for public acts. The Supreme Court has come to assume 
that the clause is self-executing as to public acts. But is that so? Is 
it so without any limitation? Although much has been ·written on 
the subject, historically1 and generally, we do not seem to have 
any definite answer to these questions. 
At an early stage of the Republic the same kind of problems 
were argued back and forth with regard to full faith and credit 
for judgments. These questions have come to a rest. Why do they 
continue to be with us for public acts? What, if any, conclusions 
may have to be dra1vn from the judgments field for public acts? 
All this remains to be fully explored. Yet certain definite ideas 
(for example, that the command of full faith in the Constitution 
is self-executing for public acts) have come to establish themselves 
in many minds as if they were proven facts. If only because of the 
little if anything achieved by the Supreme Court in this direction, 
circumspection would seem to be in place. Conflicts resulting 
from differing public acts have not come any closer to solution. 
• This article is a product of the author's research in Early History of American 
Conflict of Laws under a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship.-Ed. 
tLecturer in Law, New York University School of Law.-Ed. 
1 See, notably, Costigan, "The History of the Adoption of Section I of Article IV of 
the United States Constitution," 4 CoL. L. REv. 470 (1904); Corwin, "The 'Full Faith 
and Credit' Clause," 81 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 371 (1933); Ross, "'Full Faith and Credit' in a 
Federal System," 20 MINN. L. R.Ev. 140 (1935); Radin, "The Authenticated Full Faith 
and Credit Clause: Its History," 39 ILL. L. REv. l (1944); Childs, "Full Faith and Credit: 
The Lawyers Clause," 36 KY. L. J. 30 (1947); Page, "Full Faith and Credit: The Dis-
carded Constitutional Provision," 1948 Wrs. L. REv. 265; Sumner, "The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose," 34 ORE. L. REv. 224 (1955). 
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Consequently, continued search with an open mind for the most 
adequate reading of the clause would seem to commend itself. 
There may be some question of the extent to which knowledge 
about the origin of the clause and thoughts of the members of the 
Constitutional Convention who were connected with the drafting 
can help in making the best use of the clause under present-day 
conditions, but the thoughts of the originators, if known, should 
be given close attention. Recently, historical materials have been 
used extensively in connection with a plea for a new "true" read-
ing of the Constitution.2 The Full Faith and Credit clause has 
been included in the treatment.3 The present writer has found it 
opportune to make his own historical investigation for independ-
ent evaluation. Wide room has been found for closer analysis of 
the known facts, and -such analysis has been undertaken with to-
day's problems in mind. A fair amount of materials hitherto not 
used have been found providing here and there welcome clarifica-
tions. All facts considered have been set out so as to enable the 
reader to draw his own ·conclusions. 
Interest here is concentrated on full faith and credit for public 
acts. But what led to insertion of the command respecting public 
acts cannot be divorced historically from the study of the com-
mand of full faith for judgments. The whole field, therefore, has 
been included in the reexamination. Clarifications obtainable on 
the "judgments" side, it will be seen, help also on the "public 
acts" side. On both sides there are historical facts which deserve 
greater attention than has been hitherto given, and if, as a result, 
some of the myths surrounding the' Lawyers Clause are exploded, 
the rethinking may have consequences fully compensating for a 
seeming loss. The analysis has been carried through to the events 
of our own days. 
I 
Precursor of the Full Faith and Credit clause in the Constitu-
tion is the Full Faith and Credit clause in the Articles of Con-
federation. This clause, the last paragraph of Article IV, read: 
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each of these States to the 
records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates 
of every other State."4 Opening with the famous, "The better to 
2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1953). 
3Id. at 542. 
419 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, Ford ed., 214, 215 (1912). 
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secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse amongll 
the people of the different States of the Union," Article IV had 
also a clause on Extradition of Fugitives from Justice and, further-
more, a Privileges and Immunities clause. 
None of these clauses were in the draft of Articles of Confed-
eration upon which the Continental Congress agreed on August 
20, 1776.6 They were added a year later when the Congress took 
up proposals for additional Articles. A committee of three-Rich-
ard Law of Connecticut, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, James 
Duane of New York-was appointed on November 10, 1777 to 
take these proposals into consideration and report such as they 
should judge proper.7 The committee, the following day, re-
ported seven new articles, among them an Extradition, a Full 
Faith and Credit, and a Privileges and Immunities clause.8 
The Full Faith and Credit clause was reported as follows: 
"That full faith and credit shall be given in each of these 
States to the Records, Acts, and Judicial Proceedings of the 
Courts and Magistrates of every other State, and that an 
Action of Debt may lie in the Court of Law in any State for 
the Recovery of a Debt due on Judgment of any Court in 
any other State; provided the Judgment Creditor gives suffi-
cient Bond with Sureties before Said Court before whom 
Action is brought to respond in Damages to the Adverse 
Party in Case the original Judgment should be afterwards 
reversed and Set aside."9 
The vote was one day later, on November 12, 1777. The first part 
of the clause, "That full faith and credit ·shall be given in each 
of these States to the Records, Acts and Judicial Proceedings of 
the Court and Magistrates of every other State," was adopted with-
out any change and, it would seem, without debate.10 But an 
Ii It read. "between" until tbe final editing, Nov. 15, 1777. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CON• 
TINENTAL CONGRESS, Ford ed., 906, 908 (1907). Cf. Brown, Book Review, 67 HAR.v. L REY. 
1439, 1449 (1954). 
o 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, Ford ed., 674 (1907). 
7 9 id. at 885: "Sundry propositions ,being laid before Congress in addition to the 
articles of confederation: Resolved, That a committee of three be appointed to take tbe 
same into consideration, and report such as tbey shall judge proper to be added to the 
articles of confederation, not changing or altering any of tbe articles already agreed on." 
8 Id. at 887. The otber clauses were: freedom of speech in Congress; power to cen-
sure and fine members of Congress; bills of credit to be charged against the United 
States; jurisdiction for controversies concerning private rights of soil claimed under dif. 
ferent grants of two or more states. 
9 Id. at 887. In the handwriting of Richard Law, as tbe tbree preceding articles, 
witb some verbal changes introduced by Duane. Id., note 5. 
10 Id. at 895. 
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amendment was proposed-the Journal does not say by whom-
stating the second part of the clause-on bonding-as reported11 
and adding a third part: "and provided the party against whom 
such judgment may have been obtained, had notice in fact of the 
service of the original writ upon which such judgment shall be 
founded .... " 
The amendment with its two distinctly separate proposals-
bonding and requirement of notice-was defeated in one voting.12 
Among those voting against were all three committee members. 
For the amendment voted Henry Marchant of Rhode Island, Eli-
phanet Dyer and William Williams, the two colleagues of Richard 
Law from Connecticut, Benjamin Rumsay of Maryland, and Dan-
iel Roberdeau of Pennsylvania. 
Any basis for assuming that the clause as first reported origi-
nated with the committee of three is lacking.13 The committee 
had only one day to pass over the (probably) numerous proposals 
submitted for additional Articles. Max Radin's suggestion14 that, 
perhaps, Richard Law, of the committee, was the author of the 
clause, is unsupported by information furnished by the Journal 
of Congress or any other source referred to by him. Assuming the 
whole of the original proposal came from one side, the author 
would, normally, have voted at least for the first part of the amend-
ment. Of those who voted for the amendment, one probably was 
the author15 of the second part-the notice requirement-but, 
again, whether he or any other of those voting for the amendment 
had been responsible for the original proposal, we do not know. 
None of the few facts which we have suggest it. 
The question dealt with by the clause was not novel and it 
certainly was familiar to the lawyers among the delegates. But 
nothing suggests that the proposal originated with one of the dele-
gates attending the congress at the time of the voting. The pro-
posal could have come directly from one of the states-which sub-
stantially widens the possibilities of authorship. 
11 Ibid. As edited by Duane, note 9 supra. 
12 Id. at 896. No: Folsom, N.H.; Gerry, Mass.; Law, Gonn.; Duane, N.Y.; Elmer, N.J.; 
'Clingan, Pa.; Smith, Md.; Jones, R. H. Lee, F. L. Lee, Harvie, Va.; Penn, Harnett, N.C.; 
Laurens, S.C. 
13 Duane did some minor editing on the second-the bonding-part. Id. at 887, 
note 5. 
14 Radin, "The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History," 39 !LI.. 
L. R.Ev. I at 4 (1944). . 
15 Henri Marchant, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Eliphanet Dyer, a mem-
ber of the Superior Court of Connecticut, were the lawyers among them. 
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The Continental Congress had been in session since September 
5, 1774. Earlier in the year the subject of enforcement of foreign 
judgments had been dealt with in t:Iie legislature of the Province of 
Massachusetts Bay. According to the Journal of the Massachusetts 
House of Representatives,16 on January 31, 1774 upon a motion 
(it is not said by whom) Mr. Hopkins17 was ordered to bring in a 
bill "to enable persons to bring and maintain actions of debt upon 
judgments obtained in the courts of law in other governments." 
The bill was read on February 14 the first time,18 read and passed 
to be engrossed on February 2310 and passed to be enacted on 
March 4, 1774.20 On March 8, 1774, according to the Journal, Sam-
uel Dexter came down from the Council Board and proposed an 
amendment to the bill. The House concurred in the amendment21 
(the contents of which we do not know) and instructed Samuel 
Adams22 to acquaint the Board with the concurrence. The follow-
ing day, the Governor informed the House23 that he had given his 
consent to this and a number of other bills. 
The Act now carried the title: "An Act to enable persons to 
bring forward and maintain actions of debt in the executive courts 
within the Province, upon judgments recovered in the neighbor-
ing governments, and upon judgments recovered before Justices 
of the Peace in this Province." The amendment may have brought 
about the limitation to judgments from "neighboring" govern-
ments, or it may be the source of the unrelated second part of the 
Act dealing with Massachusetts judgments from Justices of the 
Peace. 
Governor Hutchinson, on April 5, 1774, reported the Act to 
the Lords of Trade with this comment: "To make the record of a 
judgment in the neighboring Colonies evidence equal to the judg-
ment itself. As the Superior Court have been in doubt whether 
such record could be admitted, the provision by the Act becomes 
necessary."2~ 
16 JOURNAL, volume beginning May 26, 1773, at p. 112, 5 Acts and Resolves of the 
Province of Massachusetts Bay 369 (1886). 
17 Mark Hopkins, of the County of Berkshire. 
18 JOURNAL, p. 153. 
10 Id. at 185. 
20 Id. at 227. 
21 Id. at 239, 5 Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 369 (1886). 
22 Samuel Adams was clerk of the House at the time. 
23 JOURNAL, p. 241. 
24 "Mass. Bay," Board of Trade, vol. 82, p. 58, according to 5 Acts and Resolves of 
the Province of Massachusetts Bay 369. Before the Board of Trade on June 16, Oct. 25, and 
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Before proceeding further, it is proper to recall that the Col-
ony of Massachusetts Bay did not for the first time concern itself 
with neighbor problems in this' field. About a hundred and thirty 
years earlier the Confederation of New England Colonies had 
dealt with the subject. The Articles of Confederation of 1643 did 
not cover enforcement of judgments, although they made pro-
\tlsion for extradition of fugitives from justice,25 but when the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies met at Hartford the next 
year, the question was raised "of what esteem and force a verdict 
or sentence of any one court within the colonies ought to be qf 
in the court of another jurisdiction. "26 And the Commissioners, 
on September· g, 1644, recommended to the general courts 
"that every such verdict or sentence may have a due respect 
in any other court through the Colonies where occasion may. 
be to m~ke use of it, and that it may be accounted good evi-
dence for the plaintiff until either better evidence or some 
other just cause appear to alter or make the same void, and 
-that in such case, the issuing or the cause be respited for some 
convenient time, that the court may be advised which were 
the verdict or sentence first passed."27 
Shortly afterward, the Province of Connecticut enacted a law 
implementing the recommendation, with a reciprocity require-
ment. 
". . . Ordered that any verdict or sentence of any court with-
in the colonies, presented under authentic testimony, shall 
have a due respect in the several courts of this jurisdiction, 
where there may be occasion to make use thereof, and shall 
be accounted good evidence for the party, until better evi-
dence or other just cause appear to alter or make the same 
Nov. 5, 1774. JOURNAL OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR TRADE AND ·PLANTATIONS FROM 1768 TO 
1775, pp. 397, 399, 400 (1937). No objections raised in the report to the Privy Council. 6 
Acrs OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND (Colonial Series) 548 [918] (12) (1913). 
25 Art. 8 of the Articles of Confederation, 2 HAZARD, HISTORICAL CoLLEcrIONS 
I, 5 (1794); 9 PLYMOUTH COLONY REcoRDS 3 (1859). Extended to the Province of 
New Netherlands by Articles of Agreement of Sept. 19, 1650, with delegates of Peter 
Stuyvesant. 10 PLYMOUTH COLONY RECORDS 18, 20 (1859). See Riesenfeld, "The Formative 
Era of American Public Assistance Law," 43 CALIF. L. REv. 175 at 219 (1955). Cf. Act of 
the Colony of New Plymouth of June 1670, 11 PLYMOUTH COLONY RECORDS-LAWS 1623 to 
1682, p. 229 (1861). See Treaty of New Plymouth With Massachmetts of March 1621, 
THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAws OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH, Brigham 
ed., 306 (1836). 
. 26 2 HAZARD, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 21 (1794), 9 PLYMOUTH COLONY RECORDS 241 
(1859). 
27 Decision of Sept. 9, 1644, ibid. 
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void. And that in such case the issuing of the cause in ques-
tion be respited for some convenient time, that the court 
may be advised with, where the verdict or sentence first 
passed. Provided ... that this order shall be accounted valid 
and improved only for the advantage of such as live within 
some of the confederate colonies; and where the verdict in 
the courts of this colony may receive reciprocal respect by a 
like order established by the general court of that colony."28 
39 
Evidence that any of the other colonies at the time passed cor-
responding legislation seems to be lacking.29 
Foreign judgments had created problems also in the colonies 
farther south. Thus Maryland passed in 1715 an act "providing 
what shall be good evidence to prove foreign and other debts ... "30 
which prescribed "that all debts and records, whether by judg-
ment, recognizance, deed inrolled, and upon record, the exem-
plification thereof, under the deed of the courts where the said 
judgment was given or was recorded, shall be sufficient evidence to 
prove the same." 
Similarly South Carolina dealt with proof of foreign judg-
ments in 1731. An Act of Assembly of that year provided: 
"All exemplifications of records, and all deeds, and bonds, or 
other specialties, all letters of attorney, procuration or other 
powers in writing, and all testimonials ,vhich shall at any time 
hereafter be produced in any of the courts of judicature in 
this province, and shall be attested to have been proved upon 
oath under the corporation seal of the Lord Mayor of Lon-
don, or of any other mayor or chief officer of any city, borough 
or town corporate, in any of his majesty's dominions, or under 
the hand of the governor and public seal of any of his ma-
jesty's plantations in America, or under the notarial seal of 
any notary public, shall be deemed and adjudged good and 
sufficient in law, in any of the courts of judicature in this 
province, as if the witnesses to such deeds were produced and 
proved the same viva voce."81 
28 The law appears in the codification of 1659, Connecticut Acts and Laws, 1650, 
under the heading, "Verdict." 
29 There was also an agreement on recognition of probated wills: 2 HAZARD, HISTORI-
CAL COLLECTIONS 124, 135 (1794), 9 PLYMOUTH COLONY RECORDS 137, 149 (1859). 
30 Act of June 3, 1715, Acts of Assembly Passed in the Province of Maryland from 
1612 to 1715, No. 85 (London, 1723). 
31 Act of Assembly, 1731, COLLECTION OF ,PtmLIC LAWS, Grimke ed., No. 552, §40, 
pp. 123, 129 (1790); 1 BREVARD, ALPHABETICAL DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA 313, 316 (1814). See 5 Geo. 2, c. 7. (1732): "Act for the more easy re-
covery of debts in his Majesty's plantations and colonies in America." RussELL, THE 
REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL 131 (1915). 
40 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Reverting to the Massachusetts statute enacted in 1774,32 short-
ly before the opening of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, 
it read: 
"Whereas it frequently happens that persons against whom 
judgments of court are recovered in the neighboring govern-
ments remove with their effects into this province without 
having paid or satisfied such judgment, and, upon actions 
of debt upon such judgments brought in the executive courts 
in this Province, the record of such judgments cannot be re-
moved into the said courts in this Province, and it has been 
made a doubt whether, by law, such judgment can be ad-
mitted as sufficient evidence of such judgments, whereby 
honest creditors are often defrauded of their just demands by 
negligent and evil-minded debtors; FOR the prevention 
whereof: 
" ... [I]t shall and may be lawful for such creditors who have 
so recovered or shall hereafter recover a judgment or judg-
ments as aforesaid, to bring forward, support and maintain 
an action or actions of debt upon such a judgment or judg-
ments so recovered, or that shall be recovered in the neigh-
boring colonies as aforesaid, in any executive court within 
this province, proper to try the same in such way and manner 
as they might have done if such judgment or judgments had 
been originally recovered in the executive court in this 
province where said action of debt shall be brought. 
" ... [U]pon a plea of r,,ul tiel record or any other plea or 
pleas which may and shall be made in such action or actions 
of debt so to be brought upon such judgment, as aforesaid a 
true copy of the record and proceedings of the said court or 
courts in the said neighboring colony or colonies, according 
to the custom and usage of the colony where the said judg-
ment or judgments were or shall be recovered, ... shall be to 
all intents and purposes as good and sufficient evidence of 
such judgment, and have the same effect and operation, as if 
the original judgment and proceedings had been rendered 
and had in the court where such action of debt shall be 
brought and depending."33 
As indicated by the preamble and confirmed by Governor 
Hutchinson's report to the Board of Trade, this legislation was 
32 5 Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 323 (1886); CHARTERS 
AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSE'ITS BAY, Dane, Prescott, 
and Story ed., 684 (1814). 
83 The domestic law part dealing with judgments recovered before justices of the 
prace in Massachusetts is omitted. 
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prompted by doubts on the part of the Superior Court whether 
records of judgments from courts of other colonies could be ad-
mitted in evidence. What were these doubts? A consultation of 
Gilbert's Law of Evidence gives the answer. But a few preliminary 
words on the author and his work are in order. 
Sir Geoffrey ( or J effray) Gilbert, Lord Chief Baron of the 
Court of Exchequer at the time of his death, at the age of 52, in 
1726,34 left a series of treatises on law in manuscript which were 
published after his death. His Law of Evidence, first systematic 
presentation of the subject, became a classic. Originally printed in 
Dublin in 1754, it had London prints in 1756, 1760, 1769, 1777, 
1788, 1791, and 1801, and, furthermore, Philadelphia reprints in 
1788 and 1805. The work, praised by Blackstone in his Commen-
taries,35 furnished the basis for the books on evidence and the evi-
dence chapters in the books on Trials at Nisi Prius subsequently 
appearing.36 James Wilson recognized it as the leading text in his 
Lectures on Law at the University of Pennsylvania,37 though at-
tacking it for its reliance on the theories of Locke.38 
In the American Colonies, the Law of Evidence was in con-
stant use in the courts soon after appearance. For Massachusetts, 
Quincy's Reports39 shows that the work was referred to in nearly 
all cases where a question of evidence was the issue.40 The same 
appears for Maryland from Harris & McHenry's Reports,41 and 
34 Previously he had held the same office in Ireland for a decade. The best account 
of Gilbert is by Capel Lofft in Lofft's edition of Gu.BERT'S LAW OF EVIDENCE hl four vol-
umes (London, 1791-6, Dublin, 1795-7). Cf. 8 Foss, JUDGES OF ENGLAND 31 (1864). 
35 3 BLACKST. COMM. •376, note (n). 
36 (BATHURST] AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS, 1st ed., 
Part VI (1767); [BATHURST] THEORY OF EVIDENCE (1761); BULLER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 
RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS, (1st ed. 1772) (based on Bathurst). 
37 "My Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, the most approved, and deservedly the most ap-
proved writer on this part of the law •••• " I WoRKS OF JAMES WILSON, Bird Wilson ed., 
272 (1804); I WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, Andrews ed., 245 (1896) (Lectures on Law 1790-1). 
ss Criticisms in chapter XIII: "Of the Nature and Philosophy of Evidence," of 
W'ilson's Lectures. Gilbert had abstracted Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding" 
(printed in the Lofft edition of GILBERT'S LAW OF EVIDENCE). 
39 Josiah Quincy, Jr., Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court 
of Massachusetts Bay Between 1761 and 1772 (Samuel M. Quincy, ed., 1865). 
40Rex v. Pourksdorff, Quincy 104 (1764) (cited by Kent, either from the 1756 or 
1760 edition); Whitney v. Whitney, Quincy 117 at 118 (1765) (cited by John Adams, 
either from the 1756 or the 1760 edition); Tyler v. Richards, 'Quincy 195 at 196 (1765) 
(cited by Auchmuty, from either the 1756 or 1760 edition); Hall v. Miller, Quincy 252 at 
253 (1767): "And the Court Relied on Gilbert's Law of Evid. 191, where ••• " (quoting 
from the 2d, 1760, edition). 
41 Johnson v. Howard, I H. &: McH. (Md.) 281 at 296 (1768) (cited by S. Chase); 
Hutchins' Lessee v. Erickson, id. at 342 (1769) (S. Chase); Chamberlaine's Lessee v. 
Crawford, id. at 358-359 (1770) (Hollyday, Jenings); Hath's Lessee v. Polk, id. at 366 
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we have proof for Connecticut in William Samuel Johnson's 
Diary.42 
Gilbert begins his Law of Evidence with a statement that the 
first thing to be treated of is the evidence which ought to be of-
fered to the jury and by what rules of probability it ought to be 
weighted and considered. He recalls that, according to Locke, 
there are several degrees from perfect certainty and demonstration 
quite down to improbability and unlikeliness, and he concludes by 
saying that what is to be done in all trials of right is to range all 
matters in the scale of probability. In continuation he remarks: 
"Now this, in the first place, is very plain, that when we 
cannot see or hear anything ourselves, and yet are obliged 
to make a judgment of it, we must see and hear by report 
from others; which is one step further from demonstration, 
which is founded upon the view of our own senses; and yet 
there is that faith and credit to be given to the honesty and 
integrity of credible and disinterested witnesses, attesting 
any fact under the solemnities and obligation of religion, and 
the dangers and penalties of perjury, that the mind equally 
acquiesces therein as on a knowledge by demonstration .... " 43 
After these opening remarks on the faith and credit to be 
given to means of evidence, Gilbert takes up, successively, ·written 
and unwritten evidence. Dividing written evidence in public and 
private, he begins with records. Records, he explains,44 cannot 
be removed from place to place and must have a common reposi-
tory. Consequently, copies of records must be allowed in evidence, 
"for since you cannot have the original, the best evidence that can 
be had of them is a true copy."45 He discusses copies of statutes 
and then turns to copies of other records. Drawing a distinction 
between copies under seal and copies not under seal, he explains 
that copies under seal-exemplifications-may be under the Broad 
Seal or under the seal of the court.46 He proceeds: "Under the 
Broad Seal such exemplifications are of themselves records of the 
(1770) (Goldsborough); Smith's iLessee v. Steele, id. at 421, 425 (1771) (Goldsborough, 
Jenings). 
42 "Infancy admitted to be given in evidence under non assumpsit on the authority 
of Gilbert's Law of Evidence." Foster v. Anderson, S.C.R. Hartford, Dec. 1772, THE 
SUPERIOR COURT DIARY OF WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON 1772-1773, Farrell ed., 10 (1942). 
43 P. 4 of the 1756 and 1760 editions. 
44 P. 7 of the 1756 and 1760 editions. 
45 At p. 8. The whole part is quoted in 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1215 (1940). 
46 P. 14. Partly quoted in 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1681 (1940). 
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greatest validity, and to which the jury ought to give credit, under 
the penalty of an attaint; for there is more faith due to the most 
solemn attestations of public authority than any other transactions 
whatever .... "47 
Gilbert notes that, because the Chancery holds the Great Seal, 
a record exemplified under the Great Seal is either a record of the 
Court of Chancery or a record sent for attestation into Chancery . 
. Copies under the seal of the court, and not under the Great Seal, 
he continues, are of higher credit than a sworn copy and shall be 
delivered to the Jury48 to be "carried away by the Jury, to be seen 
and considered, that things of greater credit may be equally un-
derstood with other matters that carry less authority."49 
For the statement on the faith and credit due to exemplifica-
tions, Olive v. Guin,50 a decision of 1658 of the Court of Ex-
chequer, is cited. The question there was whether an exemplifi-
cation with the seal of the court of a record from the court of 
Great Sessions in Wales should be admitted in evidence, the de-
fendant having pleaded nul tiel record. At the time, vVales was an 
independent jurisdiction with its own court system.151 Speaking 
through Chief Baron Witherington, the Court of Exchequer held 
that the exemplification was admissible in evidence but that the 
jury did not have to give credit to it under the penalty of attaint. 
" ... Et jury n' est lye a <loner credit al chescun evidence de-
south paine de attaint .... Mon corolary de tout cas est que 
le recovery desouth le seal de Breckneck est evidence, mes 
jeo ne affirme que le jury fuer tenus a <loner credence al ce 
desouth paine de attaint."52 
In the American colonies, under Olive v. Guin reliance on a 
record from a foreign jurisdiction could be made difficult, and 
47 Beginning on p. 14 in both editions. Emphasis added. Not quoted in Wigmore. 
48 P. 17. 
49 P. 18. 
150 2 Sid. 145, 82 Eng. Rep. 1303 (1658) (first published in 1684). The arguments are 
in Hard. 118, 145 Eng. Rep. 409 (first published in 1693), and reproduced, with the 
decision, in THE LAW OF EVIDENCE [ascribed to W. Nelson] 66, No. 12 (1717), 89, No. 16 
(1739, 1744 editions). The case is referred to in W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§1681 and 
2164 (1940). 
151 Act for certain Ordinances in the King's Dominion and Principality of Wales, 34 & 
35 Hen. 8, c. 26 (1542-43). Conflicts of jurisdiction were frequent. See, e.g., Act to Dis-
courage the Practice of commencing frivolous and vexatious Suits in his Majesty's courts 
at Westminster, in causes of action arising within the dominion of Wales, 13 Geo. 3, c. 
51 (1773). See OWEN, THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENGLISH LAW IN WALES AND THE MARCHES 
(1900). 
52 2 Sid. 145 at 146, 82 Eng. Rep. 1303 (1658). The judge referred to Anonymous, 7 
Eliz., 2 Dyer 236a, 73 Eng. Rep. 522 (156-!) (involving a record from Chester, but left 
undecided). 
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Gilbert's treatise had publicized the possibility. The preamble to 
the :Massachusetts statute of 1774 shows that debtors moving to 
Massachusetts from other provinces had taken advantage of it and 
pleaded nul tiel record. In view of doubts entertained by the 
Superior Court legislation had become necessary. 
When it came to the drafting by the Continental Congress of 
Articles for the new Confederation, it is reasonable to assume that 
the promoters of the legislation in Massachusetts also looked to it 
that the problem was solved for the Confederation. Did the pro-
posal to the Congress for an Article on recognition of foreign 
judicial records come from that corner? Was the proposal sub-
mitted in the language reported to the Congress by the Committee 
of Three? These questions remain to be answered. The language 
of the Massachusetts statute of 1774 is particularly clumsy, the 
Article on Full Faith a model of draftsmanship for a constitutional 
provision. Whoever drafted the clause as reported and adopted 
might have been guided by the text in Gilbert. From the passage 
that the Jury ought to "give credit" to exemplifications of records 
under the Broad Seal because there is "more faith due to the most 
solemn attestations of public authority than any other transactions 
whatever," there is only a short step to the famous formula. 
"Giving faith and credit to a record," on the other hand, is a 
term of art which had been used in English legal parlance long be-
fore Gilbert, and the formula may have been taken from the same 
source or sources from which it had come to Gilbert. The expres-
sion "giving faith and credit" was regularly recurred to in discus-
sion of the effect to which decisions of the ecclesiastical courts were 
entitled in the common law courts. In 1585, it had been held 
in Bunting v. Lepingwel,53 "et entant q' le conusans de droit de 
marriages appent al Eccle~iasticall court, & mesme le court a done 
sentence en cest case, les judges de nostre ley doient ( comme 
que soit encounter le rem,on de nostre ley) doner foy & credit a 
lour proceedings & sentences, & a penser que lour proceedings 
sont consonant a ley de saint Eglise; Car cuilibet in sua arte perito 
est credendu ... " which was later translated into English as: 54 
"forasmuch as the conusance of the right of marriage belongs to 
the Ecclesiastical Court, and the same Court has given sentence 
in this case, the Judges of our Law ought ( although it be against 
53 As reported by Coke. CoKE, LES REPORTS 29a (1585) (published in French in 1604). 
54 4 Co. Rep. 29a, 76 Eng. Rep. 950 at 952 (1585) (first published in 1658), quoted by 
Kent, J., in Vandenheuvel v. The United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 127 at 141-143 
(1801). 
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the reason of our Law) to give faith and credit to their proceed-
ings and sentences, and to think that their proceedings are con-
sonant to the Law of Holy Church, for cuilibet in sua arte perito 
credendum. "55 
The formula appeared in the English text of Coke's report of 
Caudrey's Case/6 decided ten years later and likewise involv-
ing an ecclesiastical court determination: ". . . the Judges of 
the Common Law ought to give faith and credit to their sen-
tences, and to allow it to be done according to the ecclesiastical 
law .... And this is the common received opinion of our books, as 
appeareth 11 H. 7. 9. 34 H. 6. 14, & c. And in Bunting and Lep-
pingwel' s case, in the Fourth Part of my Reports." It reappears 
whenever the effect of an ecclesiastical court decision was the issue, 
as, for example, in Grove v. Elliott,51 decided in the late 17th 
century: "We must give faith and credit to their proceedings, and 
presume they are according to their law, 4 Co. 29." Sometimes it 
was shortened to "we ought to give credit,"58 "ought to give 
credence,"59 "we must give credit,"60 or to "nous doyomus <loner 
credence al eux."61 And in the shortened version it is found, on 
occasion, also in decisions involving recognition of an adjudica-
tion by a foreign court of admiralty, as, for example, in Hughs v .. 
Cornelius,62 decided by the King's Bench in 1682. 
The holding in the Bunting case was quoted in the English 
courts about eighteen months before the Continental Congress 
added to the Articles the Full Faith and Credit clause. It happened 
in a cause celebre, the Trial of Elizabeth Duchess-Dowager of 
55 "Experts should be trusted in their art." (trans. ours). 
56 5 Co. 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 1 at 8 (1595) (first published in 1605). The Latin te.xt 
merely said: "communi legis Judices ipsorum sententiae fidem adhibere et eandem ap• 
probare, juxta legem ecclesiasticam latam fuisse debent." Ibid. For these jurisdictional 
conflicts, see Lord Coke on Jurisdiction of Courts, 4 Co. INST. 321 (1644). 
57 2 Ventr. 41, 86 Eng. Rep. 296 at 298 (1670) (Archer, J.). 
58 Kenn's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 42b, 77 Eng. Rep. 474 at 476 (1606). 
59 Baker v. Rogers, Cro. Eliz. 788, 78 Eng. Rep. 1018 at 1019 (1601). See WATSON, 
THE CLERGY-MAN'S LAW, 4th ed., 43 (1747). 
60 Sir J. Nedham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 135a, 77 Eng. Rep. 678 at 679 (1610); Jones v. Bow, 
Carth. 226, 90 Eng. Rep. 735 (1692). Cf. Lord Nottingham in Cottington's Case, 1678, 
cited, 2 Swan. 326n, 36 Eng. Rep. 640n. (1818). 
61 Hitcham and Glovers Case, 2 Rolle 6, 81 Eng. Rep. 623 (1618). Cf. 2 Rolle, Abr. 
219 (1668). See Prisot's argument in a case involving quare impedit, 34 Hen. 6, fol. 38, 
40, quoted by Jefferson in his Tract, "Whether Christianity is a Part of the Common 
Law," 1 Jefferson's Reports 137 (1829), discussed by Story, "Christianity a Part of the 
Common Law," 9 AM. JURIST 346 (1833). Cf. HOWE, READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL 
HISTORY 24 (1949). 
62 Ld. Raym. 473, 83 Eng. Rep. 247 (1682): (" .•. we ought to give credit to it, 
or else they will not give credit to the sentences of our Courts of Admiralty''). 
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Kingston for bigamy,63 which took place before the House of 
Lords, sitting at Westminster Hall, from April 15 to 22, 1776. 
James Wallace, one of the defense counsel, argued in the trial 
that the alleged first marriage of the duchess had been considered 
by an ecclesiastical court and held non-existent and that the Lords 
were bound by that decision. He began his discussion of cases with 
the Bunting case and recited the passage above quoted that "the 
judges of our law ought to give faith and credit to their pro-
ceedings. "64 · 
"Because the curiosity of Europe would be excited," Lord 
Mansfield had not favored holding the trial. 65 The sensational 
affair was closely followed in Scotland66 and probably everywhere 
else. Like other law books, the complete report of the trial, printed 
in 1776,67 must have reached the colonies in due course.68 Thus, at 
least in theory a link between the language of our Full Faith and 
Credit clause and the trial of the Duchess cannot be excluded. 
Those who prefer to think of other possible links can point 
out that, apparently, use of this language was not uncommon. 
They may refer to a passage in a letter by Lord Hardwicke to Lord 
Karnes, written in 17 54 in answer to a proposal for assimilation of 
Scotch and English law: 
"Might it not ];>e right to begin with the law relating to 
Crimes which concern the public policy and government 0£ 
the United Kingdom .... If to this were added the establish-
ing of a comitas jurisdictionum, or the giving mutual faith 
and credence to the judgments and decrees of the sovereign 
courts in each country, as res judicatae, it would be a good 
step."69 
63 Rex: v. Duchess of Kingston, The Trial of Elizabeth Duchess of Kingston for 
Bigamy (London: Printed for Charles Bathurst, in Fleet Street, 1776), 34 H.L.J. 655, 11 
STATE TRIALS 198 (1781); 20 HowELL, STATE TRIALS 355 (1814). Opinion of the Law Lords 
in 2 SMITH'S LEADING CASES 424 (1841). 
64 At pp. 20, 21 of the 1776 print; pp. 261, 262 of the 1781 ed.; pp. 391, 392 of the 
1814 ed. The duchess was found guilty of bigamy. The legal issues were (1) whether a 
sentence in the spiritual court against a marriage in a suit for jactitation of marriage is 
conclusive evidence so as to stop the counsel for the crown from proving the marriage 
in an indictment for polygamy; (2) whether the effect of such a sentence may be avoided 
by proof of fraud or collusion. See Hargrave's consultation for the Crown in HARGRAVE, 
C~LLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 449, 453, (1787). 
65 In the House of Lords, Dec. 20, 1775, 18 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
1107, 1110 (1813). 
66 See the reference to the trial by Lord President Campbell in Watson v. Renton, 1 
BELL'S COURT OF SESSION CASES 92, 108 (1792). 
67 By order of the House of Lords of April 22, 1776. 
6S Jefferson had a copy of the original, 1776, edition. 2 CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Sowerby ed., 298 (1953). 
691 WOODHOUSELEE, MEMOIRS OF LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HENRY HOlllE OF KAMES 211 
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They may also recall that a full faith and credit formula had been 
used in the diplomatic practice in Letters of Credence since the 
Middle Ages;70 that a "full faith" command was encountered also 
(1807); 1 YORKE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF PHILIP YORKE, EARL OF HARDWICKE 623 
(1913). Scotch courts denied res judicata effect. See 1 BANKTON, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
SCOTLAND 33 (1751) (second volume, 1752, dedicated to Lord Hardwicke). For Lord Hard-
wicke's views on the effect of foreign judgments, see Otway v. Ramsay, 4 B. 8: C. 414n, 
107 Eng. Rep. lll3n (1737); Gage v. Bulkeley, Ridg.t.H 263, 27 Eng. Rep. 824 (1744). Cf. 
Gage v. Stafford, 2 Ves. Sr. 556, 28 Eng. Rep. 354 (1754). In Walker v. Witter, I Doug. 
I, 99 Eng. Rep. 1 at 4-5 (1778), Lord Mansfield said: " .•• he recollected a case of a decree 
of the Chancery side in one of the Courts of Great Sessions in ,vales, from which 
there was an appeal to the House of Lords, and the decree affirmed there; afterwards, a 
bill was filed in the Court of Chancery, on the foundation of the decree so affirmed, and 
Lord Hardwicke thought himself entitled to examine into the justice of the decision of 
the House of Lords because the original decree was in the Court of Wales whose de-
cisions were clearly liable to be examined." On this, see Lord Kenyon's comment in 
Galbraith v. Neville, 1 Doug. 1, 99 Eng. Rep. 1 at 5n. (1789). 
70 "Litterae de credentia, apud Matth. Paris ann. 1252. Litterae credentiae et favoris, 
apud eundem ann. 1259. Litterae, scilicet, per quas quis petit, ut legato aut misso suo 
plene credatur, ac £ides habeatur in negotiis pro quibus mittitur." Du CANGE, GLOSSARIUM 
AD SCRIPTORES MEDIAE ET INFIMAE LATINITATIS, v. Credentia, Fidcs data (1681). "Vulgo 
sunt literae fidei et credentiae, quae iis redduntur qui adeuntur." PASCHAL, LEGATUS, c. 
XXI, p. 107 (Paris 1612). " ••• vulgo ••• litterae fidei, seu credentiales nuncupatae, quae 
iis dantur, ad quos Legatus mittitur, et cum quibus agendum est." GERMONIO, DE 
LEGATIS PRINCIPUM ET POPULORUI\I LIBRI TRES, lib. II, C. VII, §4 (Rome 1627). English ex-
amples: "Paternitatem vestram humiliter imploramus, quatenus praefatos Nuncios nos-
tros solita benignitate recipere et eisdem ..• indubitabilem fidem et firmam credentiam 
adhibere velitis .••• " Letter of credence of May 8, 1289, by Edward I to Pope Nicholas 
IV, 1 RYIIIER, FoEDERA, 3d ed., part Ill, 47 (1739). "Trusty and welbeloved, forasmuch 
as we have committed to our right trusty and welbeloved Lord Clifford certain matiers 
greatly concernyng the worship and welfare of oure lande and of alle oure subgetts to be 
upened unto you, we wil that in that he or any other in his name shal shewe and de-
clare unto you on oure behalve in this partie ye yeve full feith and credence like as ye 
herd us speak it in oure owne persone." Letter of credence of March 14, 1452 by Henry 
VI for Lord Clifford. 6 PROCEEDINGS AND ORDINANCES OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND 
122 (1837). "We humbly crave • • • that they will vouchsafe our commissioner • • • a 
favorrable hearing with such credit to such writings as he shall present in our names 
under the hands of our said secretary, as if we had presented the same in person, upon 
tlie faith and credit which we would not willingly violate for all worldly advantage." 
Commission to Edward Winslow by the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Nov. 
4, 1646, to answer charges before the Governor in chief and commissioners for foreign 
plantations as members of tlie High Court of Parliament, 3 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR 
AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND, Shurtleff ed., 93 (1854). 
Professor Mark De,volfe Howe called the Winslow commission to our attention. 
At the time of the Continental Congress, the French version of letters of credence 
had been shortened to "donner creance entiere." The letter of credence made out for 
Benjamin Franklin by the Continental Congress, modelled after that for the Ambassador 
from France, Gerard, merely said: "We beseach you to give entire credit to everything 
which he shall deliver on our part." In Congress, Oct. 21, 1778, 12 JOURNAL OF 1HE CON-
TINENTAL CONGRESS 1035, 1036 (1908); 2 WHARTON, REVOLUfIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRE-
SPONDENCE 802 (1889). The drafting committee had asked for Gerard's letter of credence 
CToURNAL at 908, Wharton at 709) which read: "Nous vous prions d'ajouter foi 
entiere .•.• " 11 JOURNAL at 752, 753, 754. 
As to current practice, for use of "D'ajouter foi et cre~nce entiere" by de Gaulle 
in 1945 and Bidault in 1946, see 2 DE MELLO, TRATADO DE DIREITO DIPLOMATICO, 2d ed., 174, 
175 (1949). The full form, "entera fe y credito," is still used in the Spanish language. See 
1 ERICE Y O'SHEA, NORMAS DE DIPLOMACIA Y DE DERECHO DIPLOMATICO 305 (Madrid, 1945); 
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in the matter of notarial acts. Professor Ross has found71 that in 
Pope Alexander VI's Bull of May 4, 1493 delimiting the New 
World between Spain and Portugal it was said that copies of the 
Bull subscribed by a notary ought to be given, in court and out ot 
court, that much credit as would be given to the original if pro-
duced.72 Thus notarial acts were given the status of public acts 
entitled to full faith: instrumenta publica plenam faciunt fidem; 73 
and it is not without interest that, in the instrument of appoint-
ment of notaries, also the Archbishop of Canterbury decreed 
"that full faith be given, as well in as out of judgment, to the in-
strument by him [the notary] to be made."74 
In the light of the Massachusetts statute of 1774, Gilbert's Law 
of Evidence, and the other likely and unlikely sources, was the 
Full Faith and Credit clause in the Articles of Confederation 
meant merely to solve a problem of evidence, that is, admission of 
exemplifications of foreign records, or was it designed to secure 
at the same time conclusive effect to judgments from courts of 
sister states? If Gilbert's text was the only source, the argument 
would find support that the drafter or drafters merely thought of 
removing evidentiary difficulties which had arisen. The language 
used, on the other hand, originated, as far as can be seen, with 
the problem of what substantive effect to give to decisions from 
special jurisdictions. And the Massachusetts statute itself seems 
to have gone beyond mere securing the proof of foreign records by 
providing that the copy of the foreign judgment "shall have the 
1 ANTOKOLETZ, TRATADO TE6RICO Y PRACTICO DE DERECHO DIPLOMATICO Y CONSULAR 215 
(Buenos Aires, 1948). Current United States practice: "to give full credence." See 2 DE 
MELLO, supra, at 171 (letter by President Truman); 2 GENET, TRAITE DE DIPLOMATIE ET DE 
DROIT DIPLOMATIQUE 205, No. 740 (1931) (letter by President Hoover). 
71 Ross, "'Full Faith and Credit' in a Federal System," 20 MINN. L. REv. 140 (1935). 
72 1 MAGNUM BULLARIUM ROMANUM, Cherubini ed., 466 (Lyons, 1655), reprinted with 
Richard Eden's translation from his HISTORY OF TRAVAYLE IN THE WEST AND EAST INDIES 
(1577) in 2 FISKE, DISCOVERY OF AMERICA, Appendix B (1892). 
73 See French Civil Code, Art. 1319 (1804): l'acte authentique fait pleine foi de la 
convention qu'il renferme (same: La. Civil Code of 1870, art. 2236). Derived from 
POTHIER, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS, c. IV: de la preuve des obligations, art. 734 (1761) 
(§700 in the Evans, 1806, trans.). Cf. JOH. VoET, COMPENDIUM JURIS JUXTA SERIEM 
PANDECTARUM, IADJECTIS DIFFERENTIIS JURIS CIVILIS ET CANONIC!, lib. XXII, Pand. Tit. III: 
De Probationibus et Praesumptionibus, 5th ed., 267, 268 (Leyden 1720); MASCARDUs, DE 
PROBATIONIBUS, Quaestio VI •De Secunda Probationum Specie: Quae Fit Per Instrumentum 
et Scripturam (1615). 
74 1 0UGHTON, 0RDO JUDICIORUM IN FORO ECCLESIASTICO-CIVILI BRITANNICO ET liIBER· 
NICO 486 (1738); 3 BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAw, 2d ed., 2 (1767); 2 PHILLIMORE, ECCLESIASTICAL 
LAW OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 2d ed., 945, 950 (1895). Cf. AYLIFFE, PARERGON JURIS 
CANONICI ANGLICAN! 386 (1726). 
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same effect and operation as if the original judgment and proceed-
ings had been rendered in the court where such action of debt 
shall be brought and depending." 
It has to be kept in mind, however, that non-recognition of 
the conclusive effect of foreign judgments had not become an 
issue, as far as we know, either in the English, or in the Colonial 
courts, at the time of the drafting of the Articles of Confederation. 
In sum, for the construction of the clause in the Articles one may 
perhaps have to say what Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph on 
March IO, 178475 in connection with an inquiry about the inter-
pretation of the Extradition clause of the Articles: "The truth, 
perhaps, in this as in many other instances, is, that if the compilers 
of the text had severally declared their meanings, these would 
have been as diverse as the comments which will be made upon it." 
There are only a few preserved reports of cases in which the 
Full Faith and Credit clause of the Articles was considered. In a 
Connecticut case, in which Ellsworth had been counsel,76 Kibbe v. 
Kibbe,71 decided during the September term 1786, the Superior 
Court refused judgment in personam against a Connecticut resi-
dent on the basis of a judgment obtained against the latter in 
Massachusetts by way of attachment of a handkerchief "sho,m to 
the sheriff by the plaintiff's attorney to be the estate of the defend-
ant." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania came to a similar result 
in Phelps v. Holker,78 decided during the April term 1788, that 
is, after the Constitutional Convention. Jurisdiction had been 
obtained in Massachusetts by attachment of one blanket shown to 
the sheriff as the reputed property of the nonresident defendant. 
The court held that the Massachusetts judgment was not conclu-
sive evidence of the debt claimed, Chief Justice M'Kean remark-
ing that the proceedings in Massachusetts had been in rem and 
ought not to be extended further than the property attached. 79 
Jared Ingersoll, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, had 
represented the creditor. He thought that, as had been said by 
Lord Mansfield in Walker v. Witter,80 foreign judgments were 
75 1 l.ErrERs AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 66, 67 (1865). 
76 He excused himself from giving an opinion in the case. Kirby 126n. He had be-
come a member of the court in 1785. 
77 Kirby (Conn.) 119 (1786). Kirby's Reports appeared in 1789. 
781 Dall. (Pa.) 261 (1788.) The first volume of Dallas' Reports was published in 1790. 
79 Id. at 264. 
so I Doug. I, 99 Eng. Rep. 1 (1778). The first volume of Douglas appeared in 1782. 
" ••• judgments [of certain courts of record in England] cannot be controverted. Foreign 
courts and courts in England not of record, have not that privilege, nor the courts in 
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only prima facie evidence of the debt and may be enquired into, 
but that the Massachusetts judgment could not be considered a 
foreign judgment "for, it is the record of a Court of one of the 
States of the Union, and, as such, it is entitled to full faith and 
credit in each of them. Art. of Confed. art. 4." Walker v. Witter 
had been decided in 1778, that is, after the draft of the Articles. 
It was probably the first English decision denying conclusive effect 
to a foreign judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.81 But whatever the English rule before Tiflalker v. Witter, the 
Full Faith and Credit clause of the Articles cannot have been 
aimed at removing the principle of that decision. 
A third case in which the Full Faith and Credit clause of the 
Articles was invoked is James v. Allen.82 This case was decided by 
the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County during the 
September term 1786, only a few months before the Constitutional 
Convention convened in Philadelphia.83 The question was whether 
a discharge from imprisonment for debt (not from the debt itself) 
granted by a New Jersey court on the basis of powers given the 
courts under the New Jersey Insolvency Law84 protected the 
Wales, &c. but the doctrine in the case of Sinclair v. Fraser was unquestionable. Foreign 
judgments are a ground of action everywhere, but they are examinable." 99 Eng. Rep. 4. 
In Sinclair v. Fraser, also cited in the Trial of the Duchess of Kingston, the House of 
Lords had held on March 4, 1771, on an appeal from the Court of Session, "that the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Jamaica ought to be received as evidence prima 
facie, of the debt, and that it lies upon the defendant to impeach the justice thereof, or 
to shew the same to have been irregularly or unduly obtained ..•. " Quoted in 1 Doug. 
4a, 99 Eng. Rep. 3n. MORISON, DICTIONARY OF DECISIONS 4542 (1801). This was in line with 
Scotch precedents: Edwards v. Prescot, Dec. 29, 1720, KAMES, REMARKABLE DECISIONS 1716• 
1728, No. 21, p. 59 (1729). Cf. KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, 2d ed., 370 (1767) 
(dedicated to Lord Mansfield); Nadelmann, "Non-Recognition of American Money Judg-
ments Abroad and What To Do About It," 42 low A ·L. REV. 236 at 239 (1957). . 
SI See Burroughs v. Jamineau, Mos. 1, 25 Eng. Rep. 235 (1744), 2 Str. 733, 93 Eng. 
Rep. 815 (1726). Sack, "Conflict of Laws in the History of the English Law," in 3 LAW: 
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342 at 384 (1937); Yntema, "Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in An5lo-American Law," in 2 MEMOIRES DE l'ACADEMIE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COM-
PARE 348 (1932). Outside Admiralty and Ecclesiastical law, the question was doubtful. 
See 2 TAYLOR, EVIDENCE 1145 (1848). 
82 1 Dall. (Phila. Co.) 188 (1786). 
83 The Convention opened on May 14, 1787. 
84Act of June·l8, 1783 [Wilson's N. J. Laws 338 (1784)] reviving and continuing an 
Act of Dec. 21, 1771 [Allison's N.J. Laws 356 (1776)] entitled, An Act for the Relief of 
Insolvent Debtors (providing that any resident debtor may, in conjunction with two-
thirds of his creditors, present a petition to the court; and on his making an assignment 
of his estate it was lawful for the court to discharge him from imprisonment). 
It is 9f interest (See note 103 infra) that, on June 7, 1771, the Privy Council had 
disallowed an act of the N. J. Assembly of 1770, c. VI, for the relief of insolvent debtors 
because it dealt with the case of individuals and the Privy Council favored general "acts 
of insolvency."·5 Acts of the Privy Council (Colonial Series) 315 (1912) (with the report 
of Richard Jackson, K.C., counsel for the Board of Trade). 
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debtor from imprisonment for the same debt in Pennsylvania. 
The New Jersey law had one year's residence as a statutory re-
quirement. Counsel for the debtor argued that extraterritorial 
effect should be given to the discharge both on the basis of general 
principles of the law of nations and the particular obligations 
arising from the Articles of Confederation. They cited Robinson 
v. Bland,85 a decision of 1760 in which Lord Mansfield had re-
ferred to the writings of Ulrich Huber86 in support of the applica-
tion of the lex loci; and they suggested, with respect to Article 4, 
that what Lord Mansfield declared in Walker v. Witter to be the 
case with regard to certain courts of record in Westminster Hall 
(whose decisions were unexaminable evidence) should, under 
the Articles, apply to judgments of the several courts in the 
states of the American Union. 
Counsel for the creditor, Ingersoll among them, took the 
position that the New Jersey law granted benefits for the territory 
of New Jersey only. In any event, they 'held the grounds for the 
discharge examinable and offered proof of lack of one year's resi-
dence. 
The court construed the New Jersey law as exclusively local 
in its nature and terms. Thus it did not reach the "international 
law" and the constitutional law issues. But President Shippen 
remarked that insolvency laws subsisted in every state of the Union 
and that they probably were all different from each other; that 
they had never been considered binding outside the limits of the 
state. He added: "The Articles of Confederation . . . will not 
admit of the construction contended for, othenvise executions 
might issue in one State upon the judgments given in another; 
but seem chiefly intended to oblige each state to receive the rec-
ords of another as full evidence of such acts and judicial proceed-
ings."87 
This had been a ruling on the effect of a foreign discharge 
from imprisonment for debt . . Millar v. Hall88 brought a ruling on 
851 W. Bl. 234, 96 Eng. Rep. 129, 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760). 
sol W. Bl. 234 at 257, 258, 96 Eng. Rep. 129 at 141. See Davies, "The Influence of 
Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law,'' 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 
49 (1937); Lorenzen, "Huber's De Conflictu Legum,'' 13 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1919), reprinted 
in LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136 (1947). Cf. Anton, 
"The Introduction into English Practice of Continental Theories on the Conflict 
of Laws," 5 INT. &: CoMr. L. Q. 534 at 539 (1956). 
87 1 Dall. (Phila. Co.) 188 at 191 (1788). Holding explained in Gorgerat v. M'Carty, 
I Dall. 366 at 368 (limited to discharges from imprisonment). 
88 1 Dall. (Pa.) 229 (1788). 
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the effect of a foreign discharge from the debt itself. The case, 
which had been pending for some time, 89 was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania during the January term, 1788, 
shortly after the closing of the Constitutional Convention. The 
debtor, a Maryland resident, had obtained a discharge from debt 
in the courts of Maryland under the Maryland Insolvent Law.90 
The issue was whether the discharge had effect against a creditor 
in Pennsylvania. Ingersoll, who represented the debtor, argued 
that, under English authorities, a debt paid according to the law 
of a foreign country, though in a depreciated medium, had been 
decreed to be a satisfaction, and a cessio bonorum in Holland, 
"which is a discharge there," was decided to have the same effect 
in England. These authorities, he claimed, applied to the case at 
bar with additional force under the sanction of the Articles of 
Confederation. And he cited the Full Faith and Credit clause and 
the Privileges and Immunities clause.91 Relying on Lord Karnes' 
Principles of Equity92 and Robinson v. Bland, his opponent, 
Moylan, argued that foreign statutes as such had no coercive 
authority extra territorium and were received only by consent as 
far as they were necessary to accomplish the rules of justice. He 
pointed at the Pennsylvania residence of the creditor and claimed 
that the debt was a Pennsylvania debt and that the Maryland law 
was passed after its creation.93 The court held for the debtor, 
"having considered the principles of the law of nations, and the 
reciprocal obligations of the states under the articles of Confeder-
ation." Said the Chief Justice 'for the Court: 
"It is true, that the laws of a particular country, have in them-
selves no extraterritorial force, no coercive operation; but by 
89 According to INGRAHAM, A VIEW OF THE INSOLVENT LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, 2d ed., 
185, n. 2 (1827), the action was originally brought in the Common Pleas Court of Phila. 
County and removed by habeas corpus into the Supreme Court to April term 1785. The 
case came before the court on a motion for leave to enter an exoneratur on the bail piece. 
90 Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors of March 23, 1774 [1774 Acts, c. 28, 1 KILTY, 
LAWS OF MARYLAND (1799)] continued for three years by Act of Feb. 177i, c. 17, and for 
seven years by Act of March 1780, c. 21, KILTY, LAws OF MARYLAND (1800). 
91 I Dall. (Pa.) 229 at 231. 
92 KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, 2d ed., 363 (1767): "Though a statute, as observed, 
hath no authority as such extra territorium; it becomes ·however necessary, upon many 
occasions, to lay weight upon foreign statutes, in order to fulfil the rules of justice. Many 
examples occur of indirect effects given thus to foreign statutes. • • ." Karnes' work, 
dedicated (beginning with the second edition) to Lord Mansfield, in the closing chapter 
deals with "Jurisdiction of the Court of Session with respect to Foreign Matters." Linking 
"comity" with equity, Karnes is the first to offer a comprehensive treatment in the English 
language of problems of conflicts of laws. 
93 1 Dall. (Pa.) 229 at 230. 
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the consent of nations, they acquire an influence and obliga-
tion, and, in many instances, become conclusive throughout 
the world .... From the nature of the act then, it appears to 
be founded upon equitable grounds, for general and just 
purposes; it ought therefore to be regarded in all other 
countries, and should enjoy that weight, in our decisions, 
which it naturally derives from general conveniency, expe-
diency, justice, and humanity. For, mutual conveniency, pol-
icy, the consent of nations, and the general principles of just-
ice form a code which pervades all nations and must be every-
where acknowledged and pursued."94 
53 
These few decisions are insufficient to support any specific 
construction of the Full Faith and Credit clause in the Articles.9is 
They have been recalled because a connection between the issues 
before the courts and the debates in the Constitutional Conven-
tion cannot be ruled out-even may suggest itself. 
II 
We pass to the Full Faith and Credit clause in the Constitu-
tion of the United States. A clause on "full faith" was in the 
draft constitution reported to the Constitutional Convention on 
August 6, 178t6 by the Committee of Detail, composed of John 
Rutledge, of South Carolina, Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, 
94 Id. at 232. Followed in Thompson v. Young, 1 Dall. (Phila. Co.) 294 (1788). Cf. 
Gorgerat v. M'Carty, I Dall. (Phila. Co.) 366 (1788). The interesting status of the law on 
this subject before Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (24 U.S.) 213 (1827), is well described in 
INGRAHAM, A Vmw OF THE INSOLVENT LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, 2d ed., 178 (1827), and DOR-
SEY, AMERICAN LAW OF INSOLVENCY 161 (1832). 
95 In this connection, a reaction within the Continental Congress in the summer 1781, 
that is, seven years after the draft of the article, is of interest. A committee had been 
appointed to prepare an Exposition of the Confederation, a plan for its complete exe-
cution and supplemental articles. This committee, composed of Messrs. Randolph, Ells-
worth, and Varnum, on August 22, 1781, reported that the Confederation "requires 
execution in the following manner: (1) '.By adjusting the mode and proportions of the 
Militia aid to be furnished to a sister State labouring under Invasion; (2) By describing 
the privileges and immunities to which the citizens of one state are entitled in another; 
(3) By setting forth the conditions upon which a criminal is to be delivered up by one 
state upon the demand of the executive of another; (4) By declaring the method of 
exemplifying records and the operation of the Acts and judicial proceedings of the Courts 
of one State contravening those of the States in which they are asserted; (5) • . •. " 21 
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 894 (1912). (Emphasis added.) No background 
information being available, it would be mere guessing on what may have been in the 
minds of the drafters when they thought of situations where the acts and proceedings at 
the forum clash with the acts and judicial proceedings of the state on which the party 
seeks to rely. But it is interesting that, at that stage, the drafters saw two different 
problems in need of clarification; one formal, the method of exemplification, and the 
other, substantive, the effect of a foreign judgment or proceeding. 
962 FARRAND, RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 176 Gournal), 177 et seq. (Madi-
son) (1911). 
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Nathaniel Gorham, of Massachusetts, Oliver Ellsworth, of Con-
necticut, and James Wilson, of Pennsylvania.97 The draft pro-
vided in Article XVI: "Full faith shall be given in each State to 
the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial pro-
ceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of every other State."08 
Except for the extension to "acts of the Legislatures," it was es-
sentially the clause of the Articles of Confederation. 
The discussion of Article XVI began on August 29, 1787.00 
The Journal of the Convention merely records commitment of 
the article, together with various proposed amendments. Mad-
ison's Notes of Debates are more explicit. According to the Noi:es 
(Appendix, pp. 87-88 infra), Mr. Williamson, of North Caro-
lina, said that he did not understand precisely the meaning of the 
article. He moved to substitute the words of the Articles. James 
Wilson, Pennsylvania member of the Committee of Detail, and 
William Samuel Johnson, of Connecticut, advanced explanations. 
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"They supposed the meaning to be," says the Notes, "that judg-
ments in one state should be the ground of actions in other states, 
and that acts of the legislatures should be included, as they some-
times serve the like purpose as act for the sake of Acts of insol-
vency etc." The part in italics, reproduced as identified in the 
State Department edition of the Notes,100 is stricken out in the 
manuscript.101 The last two words stricken out are difficult to 
97 Appointed July 24, 1787. Id. at 106 (Madison). 
98 Id. at 188 (Madison). 
oo Id. at 445 (Journal), 447 (Madison). 
100 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
635 (1900); 2 FARRAND, RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 447 (1911). It appeared 
neither in the Gilpin edition of the "Papers" (1840), reprinted in Elliott's DEBATES 
(1845), nor in Hunt's edition of the "Writings" of James Madison (1903). 
101 See excerpt of the Notes reproduced in the text above. 
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decipher. At what time the correction was made would be diffi-
cult to know without chemical tests. As we know, many correc-
tions were made when, between 1821 and 1836, Madison worked 
on editing the Notes for posthumous publication. Why this par-
ticular correction was maae must be left to speculation. The 
part stricken out cannot have been invented; it makes perfect 
sense and matches with what follows. 
What were the "Acts of insolvency" referred to by \\Tilson and 
Johnson? Johnson's home state, Connecticut, had no general 
bankruptcy or insolvency legislation at that time.102 Insolvent 
debtors desiring to be relieved from their debts had to petition 
the legislature for what was called a special "Act of insolvency." 
The records of the legislature, now published, show action on 
such petitions taken by the General Assembly at almost every 
session.103 The debtor received the benefit of a special act em-
102 Connecticut had a law, though, for the release of debtors by the court but the 
release was conditioned upon the creditor's refusal to advance costs for the debtor's main-
tenance. Act for Regulating Gaols and Gaolers, Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut 
in America 89, 90 (1786). 
103 Numerous examples are in 6 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 1785-
1789, Labaree ed. (1945). See the petition by James Church for an "Act of Insolvency" at 
p. 275, and the disposition of the case at the May 1787 session of the General Assembly, 
at p. 320: "Upon the Petition of James Church of Hartford bearing Date the 19th Day 
of May 1786, against his Creditors, Shewing to this Assembly that by means of many 
great and heavy losses and misfortunes in the course of trade in the last war he is greatly 
reduced and embarrassed in his circumstances and become unable to pay all his just debts, 
that he is advanced in Years and of a weakly infirm constitution of body and desirous 
that equal justice might take place amongst his creditors as far as in his power, and is 
willing to resign up into the hands of trustees upon oath all his estate both real and 
personal to be disposed of for the benefit of his creditors except his own and his wife's 
wearing apparel and their household furniture, and praying that thereupon he may be 
exonerated and discharged from all his debts contracted before the date of his petition, 
and it appearing to this Assembly that the facts stated in said petition are just and true, 
and more than four fifths of his creditors in number and value having requested the 
same by a writing under their hands and exhibited to this Assembly,-Whereupon it is 
enacted and resolved by this Assembly that upon said James Church's delivering upon 
oath and assigning unto Messrs. Richard Alsop, Daniel Pitkin and William Adams who 
are hereby appointed trustees to receive the same all his property both real and personal 
except his own and his wife's wearing apparel and their household furniture for the use 
and benefit of his creditors, and obtaining from said trustees a certificate of his having so 
done said James Church his person and property shall by force of this Act be exonerated 
and discharged from all attachments executions and suits in law or equity for and on ac-
count of any debt or debts contracted before the date of his said petition, and said trus-
tees are hereby directed and impowered to warn a meeting of said creditors to be held 
at the House of Mr. David Ball in said Hartford on the 20th of July next, by advertising 
the same in the several newspapers in this state three weeks successively twenty days be-
fore the time of said meeting, and said creditors, or a major part of them present at said 
meeting, may displace any or all of said trustees and appoint others in their stead, and also 
agree upon and prescribe regulations for said trustees in the management and disposal of 
said property and also with respect to the payment of the several dividends to the credi-
tors, and also give directions how any future meeting shall be warned and on what oc-
casions and to do and conclude any other matter and thing relating to said estate that 
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bodying all the features of bankruptcy legislation, including pro-
vision for liquidation of the estate and discharge from debts. Such 
discharge resulting from the statute served the like purpose as 
orders of discharge elsewhere granted by the courts. In the Com-
mittee of Detail, Ellsworth may well have made this point and 
promoted the change in the language of the article in the Articles 
of Confederation. A member of the Council, Johnson was no 
less familiar with the practice of his state, 104 which can easily ex-
plain his intervention in the debate. And as for Pennsylvania, 
Wilson's home state, the practice of special legislation for indi-
vidual debtors was not unknown there either. The courts did not 
receive power to release debtors owing less than 150 pounds until 
December 20, 1784,105 and individual relief acts had been passed 
almost every year, some still in 1786.106 
It was thus proper to say, as apparently it was said, that acts 
of the · legislatures sometimes serve the like purpose as acts of 
courts. "Acts of insolvency" was a perfect example; divorces 
would have been another, for in several states, including Con-
necticut, 107 divorces were granted by the legislature either ex-
clusively or concurrently with the courts. 
After the explanations advanced by the expert lawyers Wil-
son 108 and Johnson, according to Madison's Notes, Charles Pinck-
may be necessary for the benefit of said creditors." The application opened as follows: 
"Upon the memorial of James Church of Hartford preferred to the general assembly in 
May last showing that by various losses and misfortunes in trade in the course of the last 
war he is reduced in his circumstances and become unable to pay all his debts, praying 
for an Act of Insolvency to pass in his favor as per petition on file .... " The practice 
of individual acts of insolvency continued for some time. See the "Act of insolvency" for 
Josiah Huntington granted in 1794, mentioned in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 
(17 U.S.) 122 at 136 (1819), 8 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 1793 to 1796, 
49 (1951); for debtors Barber granted in October 1799, Barber v. Minturn, 1 Day (Conn.) 
136 (1803). 
104 He had attended the October 1786 session of the General Assembly which granted 
several stays of execution and protection from imprisonment in connection with pending 
applications for "acts of insolvency." See 6 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 
1785-1789, Labaree ed., 226 (1945). 
105 II Pa. Stat. L. 396 (1906). 
106 Dec. 28, 1786 (Isaac Wynn and 12 others), 12 Pa. Stat. L. 347; April I, 1784 (Long 
and others; Eberle), II id. 330, 334; Sept. 25, 1783 (Trumbower); Sept. 24, 1783 Gudson 
and others; Klein); Sept. 20, 1783 (Brown); II id. 195, 186, 180. See NOEL, HISTORY OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 59, n. 66 (1919). . 
101 Divorces: Foot, May 1785; Dudley and Widger, May 1786; King, May 1787; Bliss, 
May 1788; Spalding, Jan. 1789. 6 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 87, 208, 
334, 457, 530 (1945). See Labaree, note 104 supra, Introduction, 6 id. ix, xiii. 
10s See the first volume of Dallas for Wilson's frequent appearances in court. With 
or against the co-delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Jared Ingersoll, Wilson had 
appeared in Wilcox v. Henry, I Dall. (Pa.) 69 at 72 (1782); McCarty v. Nixon, 1 id. 77 
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ney, of South Carolina, moved to commit Article XVI with the fol-
lowing proposition: "To establish uniform laws upon the subject 
of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages arising on the pro-
test of foreign bills of exchange." 
It may well be-in any event the possibility cannot be ruled 
out109-that the move for creation of a federal bankruptcy power 
was prompted by whatever Wilson and Johnson may have said 
of interstate problems of full faith in the field of insolvency. South 
Carolina had, at the time, adequate legislation for bankruptcy.110 
The proposal for unification of the law on damages for unpaid 
foreign bills of exchange, on the other hand, may have come from 
conflicts problems which legislation on the subject in South Caro-
lina had produced.111 
Gorham, of Massachusetts, who spoke next, supported Article 
XVI and was for committal of the Pinckney proposal. Madison 
moved for committal of both. But he added a proposal of his own: 
he desired the legislature to be authorized to provide for the 
execution of judgments in other states under such regulations as 
might be expedient. He thought that it could be safely done and 
was justified by the nature of the Union. 
Randolph, fellow Virginian, disagreed with Madison. He 
thought that there was no instance of one nation executing judg-
ments of the courts of another nation. He proposed an amend-
ment: 
"Whenever the Act of any State, whether Legislative Ex-
ecutive or Judiciary shall be attested & exemplified under the 
seal thereof, such attestation and exemplification, shall be 
deemed in other States as full proof of the existence of that 
act-and its operation shall be binding in every other State, 
in all cases to which it may relate, and which are within the 
cognizance and jurisdiction of the State, wherein the said act 
was done. "112 
(1784); Brown v. Scott, l id. 145 (1785); Lazarus Barnet's Case, l id. 152 (1785); Purviance v. 
Angus, l id. 180 (Sept. 27, 1786); Pollard v. Shaaffer, 1 id. 2ll Gune 27, 1786, April 15, 
1787, Oct. 6, 1787); Miffiin v. Bingham, l Dall. 272 (1788); M'Clenachan v. M'Carty, 1 id. 
375 (1788). 
109 See Nadelmann, "On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause," l AM. J. LEGAL 
HisroRY 215 (1957). 
110 South Carolina had an Insolvency Law of 1759, 4 S.C. Stat. 86 (Cooper ed. 1838), 
modelled after 2 Geo. 2, c. 22 (1729), which was amended by Act of March II, 1786, 4 
S.C. Stat. 727. JAMES, DIGEsr OF THE LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 169 (1822). 
111 S.C. Public Laws (1786) 408, §9, 4 Stat. 727 (Cooper ed. 1838); JAMES, supra note 
IIO, at 67, 70. See Winthrop v. Pepoon, 1 Bay (S.C.) 468 (1795) (determining that the law of 
the place where the bill is drawn shall govern). 
112 FARRAND, RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 448 (19ll) (Madison). 
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After committal of this motion, a further proposal was made. 
Following up Madison's idea of grant of implementing powers 
to Congress, Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania, proposed the 
following text which was likewise committed: 
"Full faith ought to be given in each State to the public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State; 
and the Legislature shall by general laws, determine the proof 
and effect of such acts, records and proceedings."113 
A committee of five was appointed to consider Article XVI as 
drafted and the other proposals which had been committed. Rut-
ledge, Randolph, Gorham, Wilson, and Johnson were made mem-
bers.114 
The committee, on September 1st, reported the following text: 
"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the 
public acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other 
State, and the Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the 
manner in which such acts, Records, and proceedings shall be 
proved, and the effect which Judgments obtained in one 
State, shall have in another."115 
This followed closely the Morris draft, except that the committee 
had limited to judgments the right for Congress to prescribe 
"effects." 
Morris was not satisfied, and when the committee draft was dis-
cussed on September 3rd, he moved that the end of the clause 
should read, "and the effect thereof [instead of: and the effect 
which judgments obtained in one state shall have in another]," 
which meant putting public acts, records, and judicial proceedings 
on the same level for the power of Congress to prescribe· the effect. 
George Mason, of Virginia, favored the motion, as reported in 
the Notes, "particularly if the 'effect' was to be restrained to 
judgments and judicial proceedings." 
Wilson remarked that, if the legislature were not allowed to 
declare the effect, "the provision would amount to nothing more 
than what now takes place among all independent nations." The 
next speaker, Johnson, thought that the amendment as worded 
would authorize Congress to declare the effect of legislative acts 
of one state in another state. This Randolph considered as 
113 Ibid. 
114 Id. at 445 (Journal). 
115 Id. at 483 (Journal), 485 (Madison). 
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strengthening the general objection against the plan that its def-
inition of the powers of the government was so loose as to give it 
opportunities of usurping all the state powers. He was for not 
going farther than the committee draft enabling the Congress to 
provide for the effect of judgments. 
Morris' motion to amend was brought to a vote. The motion 
was carried by a majority of six versus three, Maryland, Virginia, 
and Georgia voting against, and Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South Carolina for.116 
But then came another motion. Madison moved to strike out 
the "ought to" at the start of the provision and replace it by 
"shall," and to replace the "shall" by "may" in the part giving 
Congress power to legislate. This motion shifting the emphasis was 
adopted without opposition,117 and the Convention passed to the 
discussion of the next-the bankruptcy-article. 
Only slightly changed by the Committee of Style,118 the Full 
Faith and Credit clause came into the Constitution as follows, 
forming Article IV, first section: 
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the pub-
lic Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof."119 
Madison thus commented on the clause in The Federalist: 
"The power of prescribing, by general laws, the manner in 
which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
each state shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in. 
other states, is an evident and valuable improvement on the 
clause relating to this subject in the articles of confederation. 
The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate; and 
can be of little importance under any interpretation which it 
will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very 
convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly bene-
ficial on the borders of contingent States, where the effects 
liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in 
any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction."120 
110 Id. at 486 CToumal), 489 (Madison). 
117 Ibid. 
118 The committee CTohnson, Hamilton, Morris, Madison, King) had replaced "Legis-
lature" by "Congress" and broken up the clause into two sentences, the second starting 
with: "And the Congress .•• .'' 2 FARRAND at 590, 601. 
110 Id. at 651, 661. 
120 The FEDERALIST, No. 42, Lodge ed., 266 (1888) (Madison). Immediately preceding 
is the comment on the bankruptcy clause. 
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Congress lost no time in making use of the powers granted it 
by the Full Faith and Credit clause. The subject was brought up 
during the second session of the First Congress, in the House. On 
February 1, 1790, William Smith, of South Carolina, recited the 
text of the clause and moved that a committee be appointed to 
bring in a bill, or bills, pursuant thereto.121 A committee of three-
John Page, of Virginia, James Jackson, of Georgia, and George 
Thacher, of Massachusetts-was appointed.122 According to the 
Annals of Congress, John Page presented for the committee on 
April 28, 1790, a bill "to prescribe the mode in which the public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings in each State shall be au-
thenticated."123 The text of the bill is not available.124 Again ac-
cording to the Annals on April 30, 1790, an amendment was made 
by the House sitting as a committee of the whole.125 With this 
amendment, of which we do not have the text, the bill was passed 
and became the Act of May 26, 1790, "to prescribe the mode in 
which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, in each 
State, shall be authenticated so as to take effect in every other 
State."126 It read: 
"That the acts.of the Legislatures of the several States shall be 
authenticated by having the seal of their respective States af-
fixed thereto; that the records and judicial proceedings of the 
courts of any State shall be proved or admitted in any other 
court within the United States by attestation of the clerk, and 
the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with 
· a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, 
as the case may be, that the attestation is in due form. And 
the said records and j~dicial proceedings shall have such faith 
and credit given to them in every court of the United States, 
as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from 
whence the said records are, or shall be taken." 
1211 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1105 (1834). Previously he had opposed appointment of a 
committee to bring in a bankruptcy bill, arguing that the insolvency acts in the several 
states would answer for the time being. 
122 Ibid. 
123 2 id. at 1548. 
124 According to the National Archives and Records Service, the absence from the 
files of these early bills "cannot be accounted for except that some records were lost or 
destroyed when the Capitol was burned by the British in 1814." Letter of December 6, 
1955 ,from the Chief Archivist, Legislative, Judicial and Diplomatic Records Branch, to 
the present writer. The bill for the Judiciary Act of 1789 found by Charles Warren was 
a Senate bill. Warren, "New Lights on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 
37 HARV. L. REV. 49 at 50, n. 5 (1923). 
125 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1550. 
126 Id. at 2225, 1 Stat. 122 (1790). 
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Congress thus settled authentication for acts of the legislatures, 
as well as for records and judicial proceedings. But Congress 
limited to records and judicial proceedings what it wished to say 
on the faith and credit to be given to the authenticated pieces. 
To what an extent the Massachusetts Act of 1774 or other models 
may have been consulted by the drafters is a matter of conjecture. 
And, unless the original bill is found, it will not be known wheth-
er the last part of the act, on the faith and credit to be given, came 
into the act through the amendment. 
In the Eighth Congress, in the House, Joseph H. Nicholson, 
of Maryland, moved on November 1, 1803, to have a committee 
appointed to inquire "whether any additional provisions are nec-
essary to be _made to the Act of 1790."121 A committee of three was 
appointed, with Nicholson, Thomas Griffin, of Virginia, and 
James Holland, of North Carolina, as members.128 According to 
the Annals of Congress, when, on November 25, 1803, the House, 
sitting as a committee of the whole, considered the bill intro-
duced by Nicholson on the 2d of November,129 "there was con-
siderable discussion, developing much diversity of opinion," and 
the bill was recommitted to a select committee of nine mem-
bers.130 Again we do not have the text of the original bill. An 
amendatory bill to the Act of 1790 was reported to the House 
on February 7, 1804.131 This bill was adopted, without changes,182 
to become the Act of March 27, 1804.133 
The Act of 1804 accomplished two things, both of a tech-
nical nature. First, the provisions of the Act of 1790 were extended 
to records and exemplifications of office books kept in any public 
office of any state, not appertaining to a court; second, the pro-
visions were made applicable to the public acts, records, office 
books, judicial proceedings, courts and offices of the Territories 
of the United States and countries subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States. These topics should not have led to "much 
diversity of opinion." Might the original bill have dealt, in ad-
dition, with the controversy, which was already in full swing, 
over the faith and credit to which judgments were entitled under 
127 13 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 554 (1803). 
12Bibid. 
120 Id. at 555. 
130 Id. at 625. 
131 Id. at 979. 
132 Id. at 1226, 1227. 
133 2 Stat. 298 (1804). 
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the clause and the Act of 1790? Unless the original bill can be 
found, we shall not know. 
III 
Did-and does-the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Cons-
titution, or the Act of 1790, or both taken together, provide that, 
jurisdictional requirements fulfilled, conclusive effect must be 
given to judgments from courts of other states? The courts dis-
agreed. In particvlar, they disagreed on whether the Act of 1790 
actually prescribed conclusive effect for judgments by saying: 
"And the said [ authenticated] records and judicial proceedings 
shall have such faith and credit given them in every court of the 
United States, as they have by law or usage in the court of the 
state from whence the said records are, or shall be taken." 
In examining what the courts came to decide in this respect, 
the sources available to the courts at the time of their decision 
must be kept in mind. In particular, it must be remembered that 
the Journal of the Constitutional Convention was not published 
before 1819 and that Madison's Notes of the Debates were first 
published in 1840. The latter, incidentally, means-what is some-
times forgotten-that Joseph Story did not have the benefit of the 
Notes in preparing his Commentaries on the Constitution. 
James Wilson, now on the Supreme Court of the United 
States, faced the issue on Circuit in 1794. Armstrong v. Carson/M 
in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, was an action 
of debt based on a judgment from a court in New Jersey. The 
defendant pleaded nil debet. Justice Wilson held that, since the 
plea would not be sustain~d in the courts of New Jersey, it could 
not be before a court in Pennsylvania either. "[W]hatever doubts," 
he said, "there might be on the words of the Constitution, the act 
of Congress effectually removes them; declaring in direct terms, 
that the record shall have the same effect in this Court, as in the 
Court from which it was taken."135 This decision in the federal 
court notwithstanding, in 1801 the Common Pleas Court of 
Luzerne Comity in Pennsylvania took the opposite position in 
Wright v. Tower.136 Jacob Rush, president of the court, in an 
134 l Fed. Cas. No. 543, at 1140 (C.C. Pa. 1794). 
135 Ibid. 
136 1 Browne's Rep. (Pa.) App. 1 (1801). 
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elaborate op1mon took the view that the Act of 1790 had not 
determined the effect of judgments of courts from other states.137 
In 1802, in South Carolina, a majority of four to one of the 
Constitutional Court held in Hammon and Hattaway v. Smith138 
that a North Carolina judgment was only prima facie evidence 
of the debt (Walker v. Witter139 being referred to) and that the 
Act of Congress had not declared "the effect" of judgments from 
other states. Among the majority was William Johnson, soon 
thereafter to be appointed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. He warned that, should the court go the other way, the 
next step would be to hold that a scire facias on a judgment in a 
sister state might be maintained in South Carolina.140 
While this decision did not appear in print until more than 
thirty years later, Hitchcock v. Aicken141 decided by the Supreme 
Court of New York in 1803, became available immediately. By a 
majority of three to two,1"12 a Vermont judgment was held to be 
only prima facie evidence of the debt and not conclusive as to the 
merits. All judges delivered elaborate opinions. "\Vith the major-
ity, Kent143 took the view that the clause in the Constitution meant 
nothing more than what concerned the evidence of the proceed-
ings, and he pointed at the fact that the words of the clause applied 
to public acts as well as to judicial proceedings. The Act of 1790, 
he thought, had not declared "the effect" of judgments, and he 
recalled, referring to Walker v. Witter and Karnes' Principles of 
Equity,144 that judgments from Scotland, Wales or Jamaica, were 
held to be foreign judgments in England. Brockholst Living-
ston, 145 on the minority side, relied on the clause of the Consti-
tution for the view that conclusive effect must be given. It was not 
clear, he thought, that Congress had anything to do with "the 
137 The defendant argued that, because of the separation of law and equity in New 
York, he had been prevented from pleading fraud against the New York judgment in-
volved in the case. 
138 3 S.C. L. (1 IBrev.) 110 (1802). Followed by Flourenoy v. Durke, 4 S.C. L. 
(2 Brev.) 256 (1808). 
130 1 Doug. 1, 99 Eng. Rep. 1 (1787). 
140 3 S.C. L. (1 Brev.) 110 at 113 (1802). 
1411 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 460 (1803). 
142 Lewis, C.J., Kent, Radcliffe, JJ., for; Thompson, Livingston, JJ., against. The 
question of the effect of a condemnation sentence of a foreign court of admiralty had 
been before the court before. See Ludlow and Ludlow v. Dale, 1 Johns Cas. (N.Y.) 16 
(1799); Goix v. Low, I Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 341 (1800); Vandenheuvel v. The United Ins. 
Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 127 (1801), reversed 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 451 (1802). 
143 1 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 478, 481. 
144 The reference is to the 3d ed., 1778, in two volumes. 
145 1 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 466, 471. 
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effect" of domestic judgments. Disagreeing with Karnes, he at-
tacked the doctrine that foreign judgments are enforced not ex 
necessitate but only ex comitate146-which, he felt, rendered them 
little better than a dead letter.147 The rule of Hitchcock v. Aicken 
was reaffirmed in a series of later decisions.148 
In Massachusetts, the same happened as in New York. Bartlett 
v. Knight/49 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1805, in-
volved an action of debt on a judgment recovered in New Hamp-
shire. The defendant argued that he was a minor-14 years-when 
he signed the note on which the New Hampshire judgment was 
based. The court, composed of George Thacher, Theodore Sedg-
wick, and Samuel Sewall, held that full faith and credit did not 
have to be given to the New Hampshire judgment. Thacher, who 
had been on the committee in the First Congress, which reported 
the bill to become the Act of 1790, held the facts pleaded in de-
fense pleadable. For him the Article of the Constitution and the 
Act of Congress did not admit of the construction contended for 
by the plaintiff.150 Sedgwick, who had been a member of the House 
in the First Congress, took the view that the Act of 1790 stopped 
short of declaring the effect of authenticated judgments, this be-
ing left to the judicial department. In his opinion the Constitu-
tion did not force the courts to give full faith and credit in all cir-
cumstances, and he excepted the case before the court.151 Sewall 
believed the clause and the Act of 1790 merely to deal with evi-
dence.152 
146 Terminology going back to Voet ad Pandectas, §41, ad tit. Re judicat. [Voet's 
Commentaries, Book XLI (Krause trans. 1924) 6, 60], quoted in Edwards v. Prescot, 1720, 
1 KAMES, REMARKABLE DECISIONS 1716 to 1728, No. 21, p. 59 (1729), MORISON, DICTIONARY OF 
DECISIONS 4535 (1801), where the question was whether, •because of the Union, English 
judgments were entitled to conclusive effect in Scotland, as Dutch provincial judgments 
were in Holland after the Union of Utrecht under an Ordinance of April 1, 1580, art. 27. 
147 1 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 460 at 467 (1803). 
148 Hubbel v. Coudrey, 5 Johns. R. (N.Y.) 132 (1809); Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. R. 
~N.Y.) 173 (1811), per Kent, C.J. (explaining Hitchcock v. Aicken as meaning that it lies 
upon the defendant to impeach the justice of the judgment, or to show that it was ir-
regularly and unduly obtained [holding of Sinclair v. Fraser, 1 Doug. 4a, 99 Eng. Rep. 
4 n. (1771)]. 
1491 Mass. Rep. 401, 2 Am. Dec. 36 (1805); SWIFT, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 7 
(1810). An Act of 1796, "Directing the Proceedings in Actions of Debt on a Judgment 
Rendered in another State,'' allowed the action of debt "provided that such judgment shall 
be certified in the form and to the effect which is, or shall be, prescribed by any general 
law of the Congress of the United States." 1 Mass. Gen. Laws, 491 (Stearns &: Shaw ed. 
1823). 
150 1 Mass. Rep. 401 at 404 (1805). 
151 Id. at 409. 
152 ld. at 405. He maintained this view in Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. Rep. 461, 6 Am. 
Dec. 88 (1813), where he was a minority of one against Parsons, C.J., and Parker, J. (Sedg-
wick and Thacher, JJ., not sitting in the case). 
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Joseph Story, in his first literary venture, A Selection of Plead-
ings in Civil Actions, published in 1805, commented on the is-
sue153 by quoting an unidentified "eminent fawyer" who had read 
the manuscript.154 This source thought that the Act of Congress 
provided for the evidence only and referred to the doctrine laid 
down in England by Walker v. Witter.155 
Peck v. Williamson,156 with the opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, is the next case to be recalled. This is a decision of 
the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina, rendered 
during the November Term 1812.157 The question was whether a 
Massachusetts judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in 
North Carolina, and the court held that it was not. The jury was 
instructed that it could find for a sum short of what had been 
granted in Massachusetts. The Chief Justice took the view that the 
"effect thereof" part of the clause of the Constitution needed im-
plementation and that the Act of 1790 did not state the effect to be 
given to foreign judgments. He remarked that it was very doubtful 
whether this opinion would receive the sanction of the Supreme 
Court, different opinions having been delivered by Judge Cushing 
in the federal court of Virginia, by Judge Washington in a recent 
case, and also by Judge Livingston, as it seemed from a case cited 
from New York.158 Judge Livingston's dissenting opinion in Hitch-
cock v. Aicken was meant. Judge Cranch had held in Bastable v. 
Wilson's Administration,159 decided in 1803, that nil debet was 
no plea to an action of debt on a judgment from another state. 
And the opinion by Justice Bushrod Washington evidently was 
153 At p. 296. Still found in the second edition, 1829, prepared by Benjamin L. 
Oliver, at p. 338. 
154 See "Advertisement," p. vii of the 1805 edition. 
155 "It has been questioned under this law [the Act of 1790) whether a court is bound 
'to enforce the judgment of a court in another State as a matter of course, and without 
inquiry of the grounds of the judgment. The act of Congress seems to provide for the 
evidence only. In England the courts will not enforce judgments rendered by the Courts 
of their colonies, as judgments, but only as evidence, prima facie, of the debt. The grounds 
need not be averred by the plaintiff; but the defendant may object to the demand; and so 
the law is laid down in Doug. 4, 5.' " 
156 I Car. L. Repository 53, I Brunner, Col. Cas. 398, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 10,896 at 85 
(C.C. N.C. 1812). The Repository was published in 1813. 
157 The decision was rendered on Nov. 13, 1812, and not during the November 
Term 1813, as is said erroneously in the Repository. 
158 1 Car. L. Repository 53, 54, 19 Fed. Gas. No. 10,896, at 85. 
159 1 Cranch, Circuit Court Cases 124, 2 Fed. Gas. No. 1,097 at 1012 (C.C. D.C., at 
Virginia, 1803). The Cranch volume appeared in 1852. Followed by Short v. Wilkinson, 2 
Cranch 22, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,810, at 15 (C.C. D.G., at Washington, 18ll); Duryee v. 
Mills and Frazer, June 21, 18ll, not reported. 
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in the case Green v. Sarmiento,160 decided in April 18u in the 
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania. 
Green v. Sarmiento involved a New York judgment against the 
defendant who had appeared in the New York proceedings. In an 
elaborate opinion Justice Washington held the judgment conclu-
sive under the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution. 
He took the view that the Act of Congress did not go so far as to 
prescribe full faith and credit for judgments from other states. For 
him the supreme law of the land had already pronounced upon 
that subject, and a similar declaration by this subordinate body 
would have been idle, if not mischievous.161 He added that, if the 
Constitution or the Act of Congress had declared generally that 
the judgments in one state should be conclusive in every other, 
very embarrassing questions would have arisen as to the degree to 
which they were conclusive.162 
The Supreme Court of the United States settled the issue in 
Mills v. Duryee,163 decided on March 11, 1813, only a few months 
after Peck. It was held that judgments from other states had to be 
given conclusive effect. The Chief Justice and Justices Washing-
ton, Johnson, Livingston, Duvall, and Story participated in the de-
cision. Justice Johnson dissented. 
In an action of debt upon a New York judgment in the Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia, nil debet had been pleaded by 
the defendant, and his plea had been adjudged bad. Counsel for 
the judgment debtor referred to Phelps v. Holker, James v. Allen, 
Hitchcock v. Aicken, and Bartlett v. Knight. The opposing counsel 
cited Armstrong v. Carson. He "admitted" that a record authenti-
cated pursuant to the Act of Congress was to have the effect of 
160 1 Browne's Rep., App. xxx, Peters, Circuit Court Rep. 74, 3 Washington, Circuit 
Court Rep. 17, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,760, at 1117 (C.C. Pa. 1811). Browne's Reports was 
published in 1811. B. Tilghman and Tilghman appeared for -plaintiff; J. R. Ingersoll, 
Dallas, and Ingersoll, for defendant. 
161 Browne, at xxxvii, Peters, at 81, Washington, at 24, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,760, at 
1119. 
162 Ibid. 
163 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 481 (1813). On a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, sitting in Washington County, in an action of debt upon a judgment of 
the Supreme Court of New York to which the defendant ,below pleaded nil debet, which 
plea, upon general demurrer, was adjudged ,bad. John T. Duryee v. Peter Mills and 
E-liphanet Frazer. Judgment of June 21, 1811. Trials 106, June Term 1811, No opinion, 
and not reported. Nicholas Fitzhugh and Buckner Thurston, Assistant Judges. Francis 
Scott Key argued for the plaintiff in error. Walter Jones, District Attorney, was the op-
ponent. The same had appeared in the circuit court. Note that the question of the con-
clusive effect of sentences of foreign courts of admiralty had been determined five years 
before in Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 434 (1808). 
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evidence only, but argued that it was "evidence of the highest na-
ture, viz., record evidence."164 
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Story. Stat-
ing that the decision depended altogether upon the construction of 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, Story repeated the 
argument made for the judgment creditor almost verbatim. 
"It is argued that this act provides only for the admission 
of such records as evidence, but does not declare the effect 
of such evidence when admitted. This argument cannot be 
supported. The act declares that the record duly authenti-
cated shall have such faith and credit as it has in the state 
court from whence it is taken. If in such court it has the faith 
and credit of evidence of the highest nature, namely, record 
evidence, it must have the same faith and credit in every 
other court. Congress have therefore declared the effect of 
the record by declaring what faith and credit shall be given 
· to it."165 
Any doubt left whether the conclusive effect was deduced from 
the clause in the Constitution or from the Act of Congress is re-
moved by the concluding paragraph of the opinion. 
"Were the construction contended for by the plaintiff in 
error to prevail, that judgments of the state courts ought to 
be considered prima facie evidence only, this clause in the 
constitution would be utterly unimportant and illusory. The 
common law would give such judgments precisely the same 
effect. It is manifest, however, that the constitution contem-
plated a power in congress to give a conclusive effect to such 
judgments. And we can perceive no rational interpretation 
of the act of congress, unless it declares a judgment conclusive 
when a court of the particular State where it is rendered 
would pronounce the same decision.''166 
Justice Johnson, in his dissenting opinion, 167 took the view 
that "faith and credit are terms strictly applicable to evidence."168 
He expressed apprehension that, if the plea of nil debet were to be 
excluded, it might lead to inextricable difficulty in a situation 
like the one they had had recently before the Court169 where a 
164 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 481 at 482 (1813). 
165 Id. at 484. 
166 Id. at 485. 
l67Ibid. 
168 Id. at 486. 
160 Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 436 (1813), decided on March 10, 1813, one day 
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judgment for $150,000 was given in Pennsylvania upon an attach-
ment levied on a cask of wine, and action of debt was aftenvards 
brought on that judgment in the state of Pennsylvania. 
The Story opinion raises the question of how a majority could 
have been obtained in the Court for resting the decision on the 
Act of Congress rather than on the Constitution. Livingston and 
Washington were on record for deducing the conclusive effect 
from the Constitution, and the Chief Justice had held only the 
other day that neither the Act of Congress nor the Constitution 
gave the judgments conclusive effect, emphasizing that the act add-
ed nothing to what the Constitution itself said. The last sentence, 
"On the whole, the opinion of a majority of the court is that the 
judgment be aflirmed,"170 and the fact that Story had to write the 
opinion, perhaps suggest that the majority was in agreement on 
nothing but the result. And the Chief Justice may have disagreed. 
For, as he later revealed,171 it was his custom to acquiesce silently 
in the opinion of the Court when he had "the misfortune to differ 
from it." In 1818, when in Hampton v. M'Connel/72 the question 
came again before the Court, the Chief Justice restated the .Lvlills 
doctrine for the Court in one sentence-"that the judgment of a 
state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every 
other state of the United States, that it had in the state where it 
was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit 
thereon in such state, and none othersi would be pleaded in any 
other court in the United States."173 
Compared with the preceding Livingston and Washington 
opinions, Story's opinion in Mills fares very poorly. Hardly ex-
plained by the junior member on the Court174 is why acceptance 
of a record as full evidence of the statements in the record must 
mean recognition of the adjudicated issue as conclusive. On this 
before Mills v. Duryee. In the Holker case, Marshall, C.J., speaking for the Court, had 
said: "Had the real case been brought before the referees • • • it cannot be assumed as 
certain that they ... would have refused to receive it [the judgment from Pennsylvania] 
as prima facie evidence of a claim to its full amount, open to such objections as Parker 
might make to it." 7 Cranch, at 452. Story, who had represented Parker, did not sit in 
the case. U.S. Sup. Ct. Minutes (B: 1806-1817), Feb. 26, 1813. For the •background of the 
Holker case, see Nadelmann, "Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments in France," 5 
AM. J. Cm.IP. L. 248 at 251 (1956). 
110 7 Cranch (II U.S.) 481 at 484 (1813). 
171 United States Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (24 U.S.) 64 at 90 (1827). 
172 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 234 (1818). 
173lbid. 
174 I,t was,Story's second year on the Bench and one of his earliest opinions. 
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it is merely said that " ... when Congress gave the effect of a record 
to the judgment it gave all the collateral consequences."175 No 
support is offered for the theory of "collateral consequences" 
which was foremost in Story's mind, as is corroborated by a foot-
note added by Story in his personal copy of 7 Cranch at the bottom 
of the page. The note,176 to "collateral consequences," reads: "see 
5 East 473 Collins v. Vt. J.vfathews." In Collins,177 decided at West-
minster in 1804 and noted in Lawes, Pleadings in Assumpsit, 
which Story had edited in 18u,178 a plea of nul tiel record was 
pleaded to an action of debt on an Irish judgment, Lawes arguing 
that the judgments of Irish courts being admitted to be records 
since the Union between Great Britain and Ireland, they "must 
be taken to be and pleadable as such, with all legal consequences, 
as the records of other courts within this part of the kingdom."179 
The court intimated that Irish judgments were properly plead-
able as records.180 Later decisions denied Irish judgments con-
clusive effect however.181 
Whatever the technical quality of Story's opinion in Mills v. 
Duryee, as far as Story is concerned, the important fact is that he 
later changed his view on the reading of the Full Faith and Credit 
clause of the Constitution and read into the clause itselP82 the 
command to give conclusive effect to judgments of courts from 
other states. Said he in his Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States, published in 1833: 
" ... Does it import no more than that the same faith and 
credit are to be given to them, which by the comity of nations, 
is ordinarily conceded to all foreign judgments? Or is it in-
tended to give them a more conclusive efficiency, approaching 
to, if not identical with, that of domestic judgments; so that, if 
the jurisdiction of the court be established, the judgment 
shall be conclusive as to the merits? The latter seems to be the 
175 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 481 at 484 (1813). 
176 Story's copy of 7 Cranch is in the Treasure Room of the Harvard Law Library. 
177 Collins v. Viscount Mathew, 5 East 473, 102 Eng. Rep. 1152 (1804). 
178 LAWES, PLEADING IN AssUMPSIT, Story ed., 344 (1811). 
179 5 East 473 at 475, 102 Eng. Rep. 1152 (1804). 
180 Id. at 474. 
181 See Harris v. Saunders, 4 B. & C. 411, 107 Eng. Rep. 1112 (1825). Cf. Sims v. Thom-
as, 3 Ir. L. Rep. 415 (1841). And see Lord Brougham in Houlditch v. Donegall, 2 CI. & 
Fin. 470 at 477, 6 Eng. Rep. 1232 at 1234 (1834). Legislation was considered. Lord Portar-
lington v. Soully, 3 My. & K. 104, 40 Eng. Rep. 40 at 42 (1834). Settled by Judgments 
Extension Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Viet., c. 54. 
182 Note that in Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1813), decided at the same time as 
Mills v. Duryee, the majority of the Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Parsons, C.J., and 
Parker, J., seemingly derived the command from the Constitution itself. 
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true object of the clause; and, indeed, it seems difficult to as-
sign any other adequate motive for the insertion of the clause, 
both in the Confederation and in the Constitution."183 
Elaborating upon it, Story referred to "some diversity of opinion" 
that had been judicially expressed upon the proper interpretation 
of "and the effect thereof,"184 stating that the opinion that the 
main section of the clause made judgments in one state conclusive 
in all others now seemed to be considered the sounder interpre-
tation.185 He remarked that, otherwise, Congress could have power 
to repeal or vary the full faith and credit given by the clause.18il 
Even at the time of that writing, Story did not have the bene-
fit of Madison's Notes of the Debates, and the few data in the 
Journal of the Convention could not convey a full picture of what 
had taken place. This applies in particular to the background for 
the change in language made at the very end of the debate when 
the command in the clause was changed from "ought to" into 
"shall" and the order to Congress to prescribe the effect was re-
duced to a power of discretion. 
The key to the reading of the debates, and of the clause as it 
emerged, we think is the due consideration of the fact that Walker 
v. Witter was known in the states, and known to some at least of 
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. It was known 
that, under the doctrine of Walker v. Witter, judgments of foreign 
courts were examinable; that, on the other hand, "implicit faith" 
183 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUfION OF THE UNITED STATES §1303 (1833). 
STORY, COMllrENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUfION OF THE UNITED STATES, abridged edition, §661 
(1833): "The clause of the Constitution propounds three distinct objects; first, to declare 
that full faith and credit shall be given to the records, & of every other state; secondly, 
to prescribe the manner of authenticating them; and thirdly, to prescribe their effect, 
when so authenticated. The first is declared, and established by the Constitution itself, 
and is to receive no aid from, nor is susceptible of any qualification by, congress. The 
other two are expressly subjected to the legislative power." Cf. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §609 (1834). 
184 STORY, COMllrENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUfION OF THE UNITED STATES §1306 (1833). 
Note that the New York legislature, in prescribing the authentication of records of 
courts of a foreign country, specially provided, and still provides, that the provision 
shall not be construed as declaring the effect of a record authenticated as prescribed. 
2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 396 (1829) Pt. III, c. VII, tit. III, art. III, §§26 to 28. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, 
(Clevenger, 1957) §397. 
185 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUfION §1307 (1833). Story adds: "But it 
is not, practically speaking, of much importance which interpretation prevails; since 
each admits the competency of congress to declare the effect of judgments when duly 
authenticated; so always, that full faith and credit are given to them; and congress by 
their legislation have already carried into operation the object of the clause.'' See M'El-
moyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 312 at 324-325 (1839). 
180 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUfION §1306 (1833). Cf. Hare, note, in 2 
HARE AND WALLACE, SELECT DECISIONS OF AMERICAN COURTS, 5th ed., 611, 659 (1871). 
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was given by the courts of Westminster to the record of certain 
courts in England of record, with the consequence that judg-
ments from these courts could not be controverted. What effect 
then was to be given by an American court to judgment from a 
court of a sister state? 
Primarily as a result of Walker v. Witter the question had be-
come a subject of controversy in the American courts for the Art-
icles of Confederation. In the Constitutional Convention no dif-
ference of opinion existed on that score: the intention was not to 
subject judgments from sister states to the rule of Walker v. Witter 
for foreign judgments. Disagreement arose on whether to allow di-
rect execution through an implementing law, as Madison suggest-
ed. When the language of the command part in the clause was a 
mere admonition and Congress was, on the other hand, put under 
a duty to "prescribe the effect," Wilson remarked, in support of 
the mandate for Congress, that, without that, the provision would 
amount to nothing more than "what now takes place among all 
independent nations." Then, at the very end,. after the issue about 
public acts had been voted upon, the reshuffling took place in the 
assignments to the clause itself and to Congress. The "shall" went 
into the constitutional command, and the "shall" for congressional 
action was reduced to "may." This sanctioned for judgments what 
everybody had wanted: through the command of full faith and 
credit in the clause itself they were entitled to "implicit faith," to 
the faith that judgments of courts in England of record received 
from the courts of Westminster. To that extent the clause of the 
Constitution became self-executing. 
While this question has not been adjudicated by the Supreme 
Court of the United States for judgments in modern times, the 
Court, it would seem, has embraced the theory that the command 
part of the Full Faith and Credit clause is self-executing. For, 
othe~vise, the Court could not have applied, as it did, the Fu.11 
Faith and Credit clause to public acts at a time when Congress had 
passed no legislation on the effect of public acts. 
IV 
What is the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit clause as 
far as "public acts" are concerned? Is the command that "Full 
faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts ... 
of every other state" in the same way, or in some way, self-execut-
ing as the command regarding judgments? 
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In view of what was said at the Constitutional Convention, 
an assimilation to judgments of "acts of the legislatures which 
serve the like purpose as ·judgments," clearly suggests itself. What 
can be said for judgments applies with equal force to these acts of 
combined legislative and judicial character. 
But "public acts" in the clause is not restricted to this today 
very rare type of acts of legislatures. "Public acts" was substituted 
for what had been "acts of the legislatures" in the Committee of 
Detail text drawn from the original Morris proposal. When Mor-
ris subsequently urged that Congress receive mandate to prescribe 
the effects of public acts, as well as of records and judicial proceed-
ings, at least one of those participating in the debate, William Sam-
uel Johnson, gave "public acts" a much broader meaning. For he 
opined that this would authorize Congress to declare the effect of 
legislative acts of one state in another state, and he was not con-
tradicted. Violently objecting to the grant of such powers to Con-
gress, Randolph likewise must have given "public acts" a broad 
meanmg. 
The mandate for Congress to prescribe the effect of public 
acts went into the clause by vote of six to three, Virginia voting 
"no." Immediately following, it will be recalled, Madison ob-
tained substitution of "may" for "shall"; that is, the mandate was 
reduced to a discretional power for Congress. According to Mad-
ison's Notes, this vote was: "nem: con." The feeling must have 
been that it was better to leave it to Congress, if it wished, to pre-
scribe. the effect of public acts of one state in another state. It 
was a compromise acceptable to all, obtained through a method 
many times used at the Convention.187 
It is true that, by the same vote, the "ought to" in the com-
mand part of the clause became "shall," and the suggestion has 
been made recently188 that the intention was to make the clause 
self-executing as to public acts but to give Congress power to im-
pose limitations. In the record we have nothing that supports this 
view. Madison would have made a motion against his own interest 
inasmuch as he was against a mandate for Congress to prescribe 
the effect of public acts, and the other delegates from Virginia, as 
187 See, e.g., the June 5, 1787 compromise on establishment of inferior federal courts. 
I FARRAND, RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124, 125 (Madison) (1911). 
188 Sumner, "Full Faith and Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose," 34 ORE. L. 
REv. 224 at 237 (1955); Sumner, "The Status of Public Acts in Sister States," 3 U.C.L.A. 
L. REv. 1 at 2 (1955). 
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well as those from Maryland and Georgia, would certainly have 
voted against, as they did against Morris' original motion. 
As far as the record goes, the view that the clause was designed 
to convey, without implementing law, to the courts of one state 
a constitutional command that they apply, whatever their own 
law, the legislative acts of another stare, finds no support in the 
intentions of the drafters, including Morris. The language of the 
clause does not bar a reading in accord with the intentions. Such 
reading is indeed required when unacceptable results are reached 
through different reading. Several times, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has pointed out189 that a rigid and literal en-
forcement of the Full Faith and Credit clause for "acts" would 
lead to the absurd result that, whenever a conflict arises, the stat-
ute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but 
cannot in its own. Should what is obvious have escaped the atten-
tion of the drafters of the clause? 
For about a century after the making of the Constitution, the 
general view was that, for "public acts," the command in the Full 
Faith and Credit clause was not self-executing. The First Con-
gress, in using as it did the power to prescribe "effects" with re-
spect to records and proceedings, but not with respect to public 
acts, must have had this view. And it was shared by the Marshall 
Court which did not use the clause for "public acts." It was the 
view of the foremost authority on conflict of laws, member of the 
Court-yet Story never missed an occasion to plead for fullest use 
of federal powers. 
The new look at the clause which resulted in application by 
the Supreme Court of the clause to legislation in certain limited 
areas100 began, it would seem, some time at the beginning of this 
century.191 Its origin, difficult to trace, may have some connection 
with the fact that the clause had come to be accepted as self-execut-
ing for judgments. If this was so for judgments, "it cannot but be 
189 Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 at 547 (1935), 
per Stone, J.; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 466 
at 493, 502 (1939), per Stone, J. Cf. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 
U.S. 66 at 73 (1954). 
190 Cases collected and discussed in Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Carroll v. Lanza, 
349 U.S. 408 at 416 (1955). 
191 Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335 at 345 (1903) (broached and rejected); Johnson v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 491 at 496 (1903) (broached); Eastern Building and Loan Assn. 
v. Williamson, 189 U.S. 122 at 125 (1903) (seemingly assumed); Converse v. Hamilton, 
224 U.S. 243 at 261 (1912) (assumed); Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 
U.S. 531 at 546 (1915) (seemingly assumed), relied on in Modern Woodmen of America 
v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 542 at 551 (1925). 
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the same for public acts" is a small step to reason. And the argu-
ment can indeed be made with little hesitation for situations 
where the public act is not in conflict with the law of the forum. 
The next is not to distinguish between non-conflict and conflict 
situations. 
In his Cardozo Lecture of 1945 on the Full Faith and Credit 
clause,192 Justice Jackson, protagonist of use of the clause for de-
velopment of a truly national system of justice, 193 confined his 
comment on our question to this in a footnote: 
"Whether it [the clause] is self-executing [as to state's 
statutes or to its common law] has been questioned in state 
courts. See Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required 
for Public Acts (1929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 383, 388. But see 
M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325 (U.S. 1839); 2 STORY 
ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th Ed. 1891) 193. In fact, no re-
quirement of faith and credit for statutes exists unless the 
clause is self-executing. See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. 
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932)."104 
The passage in Story referred to,195 written in 1833, suggests for 
judgments, and not for public acts, that the better view seemed 
to be to consider the command in the clause self-executing rather 
than relying on the Act of 1780 for the conclusiveness of judg-
ments. In M'Elmoyle v. Cohen196 the question was whether the 
statute of limitations of Georgia could be pleaded to an action in 
Georgia founded upon a judgment rendered in South Carolina. 
The Georgia court wanted to apply the Georgia law. Nothing 
was said about giving full faith to the public act of another state, 
nor could it have been said. Elaborating on the full faith and 
credit due to the South Carolina judgment, Justice Wayne, ·writer 
of the opinion of the Court, remarked that the faith and credit 
due it "is given by the constitution, independent of all legisla-
tion."197 He referred to his colleague's work on the Constitu-
192 Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45 
COL. L. REV. l (1945). 
193 "But the full faith and credit clause is the foundation of any hope we may have 
for a truly national system of justice, based on the preservation but better integration 
of the local jurisdictions we have." Id. at 34. 
19-1 Id. at 11. . 
195 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITlITION OF THE UNITED STATES §§1306, 1307 
of the 1833 edition, §§1312, 1313 of the 5th, 1891, edition. 
190 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 312 (1839). 
197 Icl. at 325. Cf. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., §582a 
(1841). 
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tion.198 This remark, not called for by the issue in the case, later 
was quoted out of context, leading to the thought that it applied 
not only to judgments. 
As for Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,1°9 also men-
tioned by Justice Jackson, where the Supreme Court told New 
Hampshire that it had to apply a Vermont Work.men's Compen-
sation statute to an accident in New Hampshire, Justice Bran-
deis' opinion for the Court gives no cue to the origin of the new 
view on the clause.200 And Justice Stone, in his concurring opin-
ion, stressed that he would hesitate to say that the Constitution 
projects the authority of the Vermont statute across state lines in-
to New Hampshire so that the New Hampshire courts, in fixing 
the liability of the employer for the tortious act committed with-
in the state, are compelled to apply Vermont law instead of their 
own. "The full faith and credit clause has not hitherto been 
thought to do more than compel recognition, outside the state, 
of the operation and effect of its laws upon persons and courts 
within it."201 
The new reading of the clause for "public acts" has posed for 
the Court the difficult problems of solving conflicts of laws. It has, 
furthermore, produced interesting phenomena on the sidelines. 
If a command exists with regard to application of legislation from 
other states, would it not be necessary to include judicial legisla-
tion in the same doctrine to avoid discrimination by the Constitu-
tion against judge-made law. Evidently, even for the most imagi-
native mind, coverage of court decisions by the clause is difficult 
to detect in it.202 
Inasmuch as a rigid and literal enforcement of the command 
108 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 312 at 326, citing, and quoting from, "Story's Com. 1833"-which 
is §1307 of the original, 1833, edition (§1313 of the 5th, 1891, edition). 
199 286 U.S. 145 (1932). 
200 On the subject of full faith to public acts, Brandeis merely said (at 154-155): 
"That a statute is a 'public act' within the meaning of that clause is settled" [references 
omitted]. A note reads: "Compare Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481; Rev. Stat. §§905, 906. 
See also Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72; Cooper v. Newell, 173 
U.S. 555, 567." (at 155, n. 4). As for Cooper v. Newell (1898), it dealt with a judgment and 
not a statute. In Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co. (1904), the clause was invoked for 
a statute of the state in which the case was pending. Said the Court in a dictum: "We 
do not think that the clause of the Constitution above quoted has any bearing whatever 
upon the question under consideration. It only prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal 
and state, are to be guided when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as 
to the faith and credit to be given by the court to the public acts, records and judicial 
proceedings of a State other than that in which the court is sitting." 
201286 U.S. 145 at 163-164 (1932). 
202 But see I CROSSKE.Y, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 545 (1953), who refers to the 
word "records" in the clause. Yet "records" was already in the Articles of Confederation. 
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for public acts would have absurd results, under the new look at 
the clause the question arises of how to read the command to 
avoid such results. Supporters of the view that the clause is self-
executing for public acts recently have come forward with a new 
historical doctrine offering an inherent limitation. According to 
Professors Crosskey and Rheinstein,203 it must be understood that 
the law of nations or law of conflict of laws was incorporated in 
the constitutional command that full faith and credit be given to 
public acts. And this incorporation, if we understand well, would 
follow from the fact that the law of nations became the law of the 
land and that conflict of laws was included in the ancient mean-
ing of the Law of Nations. 
This is an interesting suggestion. We think that the known 
history of the Full Faith and Credit clause furnishes no support 
for the theory. Certain broad principles of conflict of laws were 
indeed called part of the jus gentium or Law of Nations. When a 
court desired to give recognition to a foreign judgment, as in ad-
miralty or in ecclesiastical cases, it referred, in support, to the jus 
gentium-a convenient justification especially in admiralty. Such 
references are found also in some cases where a court wanted to 
apply foreign law, e.g., the law of the place of contracting. Refer-
ence would be made to Voet, Huber, or other continental writers, 
and it would be said that, it seemed, according to the Law of Na-
tions, to be the only rule of determining in these cases.204 Such 
rules would indeed not have been considered "local law" from the 
point of view of, for example, section 34 of the Rules of Decision 
Act205 where the section speaks of "the laws in the several 
states ... "; for they were supposed to be the same everywhere-
part of the jus gentium. But it is a quite different proposition to 
assume that vague choice of law rules206 were regarded adequate 
to be made the subject of a constitutional command for their ap-
203 Id. at 541, 550, 563; Rheinstein, "Das Kollisionsrecht im System des Vcrfassungs-
rechts der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," in FESTSCHRIFr FUER ERNsr RABEL 539, 555 
(1954); Rheinstein, "The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction," 22 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 775 
(1955). 
204 Examples in Nadelmann, "Story's 'De !'organisation et de la juridiction des Cours 
de Justice, aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique,'" 30 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 382 at 392 (1950); 
Rheinstein, "The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction," 22 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 775 at 
807 (1955). The opinion in Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hag. Com. 395, 161 Eng. Rep. 
782 (1752), quoted by Rheinstein, at 807, n. 124, was not published until 1822. 
205 Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, §34, 1 Stat. 92. Now 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1652. Cf. Nadelmann, 
note 204 supra. 
206 "When he [Chancellor d'Aguesseau], therefore, and so many other men of great 
talents and learning, are thus found to fail in fixing certain principles, we are forced 
to conclude that they have failed, not from want of ability, but because the matter was 
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plication in interstate relations. No Ia-wyer was unaware of the 
imperfect status of this "jus gentium"207 which would not even 
have secured conclusive effect to judgments, except in Admiralty 
and in ecclesiastical cases. The decision by the Constitutional 
Convention to reserve for Congress power to declare the effect of 
public acts was the reasonable and statesmanlike thing to do un-
der the circumstances. 
A case which was decided by the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia during the December Term 1788 illustrates well 
contemporaneous thoughts on conflicts problems, including the 
"Law of Nations." In Camp v. Lockwood,208 the plaintiff, an in-
habitant of Connecticut, had joined the British during the Revo-
lution and removed to Halifax. By a decision of the County Court 
of 1779, rendered under the Connecticut Forfeiture Act of 1778, 
his estate was declared forfeited for the benefit of Connecticut. 
The defendant, likewise an inhabitant of Connecticut, was indebt-
ed to the plaintiff. Not having paid the debt either to the State of 
Connecticut or the plaintiff, he was sued by the latter after the war 
in Pennsylvania whereto he (the defendant) had removed. Jared 
Ingersoll-it will be recalled that he was a delegate to the Constitu-
tional Convention-argued for the defendant that, because of the 
confiscation, the plaintiff had no right to sue. William Rawle, who 
was on the other side, took the view that the Connecticut confisca-
tion law and decree were not entitled to effect in Pennsylvania. 
Both lawyers made full use of the few decisions and even few-
er ·writings then available dealing with the extraterritorial effect 
of legislation and conflicts problems in general. Arguing the prin-
ciple of territoriality, Rawle quoted Vattel for the proposition that 
one nation cannot intermeddle with the government of anoth-
er.209 A collisio legum would arise, and the universal rule, as stated 
by Huber's third axiom, was that the laws and interests of the state 
having jurisdiction of the cause shall be preferred.210 In reply, 
Ingersoll observed: 
not susceptible of being settled on certain principles." Porter, J., in Saul v. His Creditors, 
5 Martin N.S. (La.) 569 at 595-596 (1827). 
207 Called "jus minor gentium" in Du Ponceau's review of Kent's Commentaries on 
American Law, I AM. Q. REv. 162 (1827). See Nadelmann, "Peter Stephen Du Ponceau," 
24 PA. B. A. Q. 248 at 252 (1953). Cf. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §24 (1834) ("practice of na-
tions, or the jus gentium privatum"). 
20s 1 Dall. (Phila. Co.) 393 (1788). 
209 Id. at 396. ,VATIEL, LAW OF NATIONS (1760). 
210 1 Dall. 393 at 397. Huber's de conflictu legum, in HUBER, PRAELECTIONES JURIS 
CIVILIS pt. 2, bk. 1, tit. 3 (1689), 3 Dall. 370 n. (trans.) (1797). 
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"that he did not controvert the general doctrine advanced by 
the opposite Council [sic], that the law of nations is the law of 
nature applied to nations, and that one sovereign power can-
not be bound by anotjier; but he distinguished between the 
necessary, and the voluntary law of nations, which arises ex 
comitate. Vatt. pref. 12. Ibid. p. 6. and insisted that the laws 
of a Nation actually enforced, are everywhere obligatory, un-
less they interfere with the independency of another Legisla-
ture. 2 Hub. 26. for, common conveniency renders it neces-
sary to give a certain degree of force to the statutes of foreign 
. Ld K . p . E 6 "211 nations. 2 • azm. rzn. q. 350. 3 o. 
He further remarked: " ... the operation and effect of a sen-
tence, or judgment, of a foreign Court cannot surely be more bind-
ing than the act of a foreign Legislature; and these, ex comitate et 
jure gentium, are in many cases final. 1 Black. Rep. 258. 262. Vatt. 
lib. 2. c. 7. sect. 84. p. 147."212 
And he concluded: 
"It is true, that the American States have hitherto been held 
by a very slight confederacy; but what remedy is to be pur-
sued? Shall we, if the knot is loose, make it still looser? . . . 
[W]hen a more perfect consolidation is essential to the nation-
al existence, shall we employ repulsion instead of attrac-
tion . . . ? Neither reason or .experience would justify such a 
construction; and the United States, though individually sov-
ereign and independent, must admit, not only the voluntary 
law of nations but a peculiar law resulting from their relative 
situation. "213 
The Court held for the defendant on the narrow ground that 
the confiscation laws of a sister state had to be noticed because 
they were passed in consequence of a recommendation to the states 
by the Continental Congress. But the arguments made indicate 
the views held by leaders of the bar on conflicts problems. Laws 
of one nation are not enforced when they interfere with the in-
dependence of another legislature. But when the second nation 
has ho adverse interest-as Pennsylvania in the case at the bar-
what then? On September 17, 1787, the draft Constitution had 
been submitted to the Continental Congress-more than a year 
before the decision. There was no reference by Ingersoll to the 
2111 Dall. (Phila. Co.) 393 at 396 (1788). 
212 Ibid. 
213 Id. at 389. 
1957] FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 79 
Full Faith and Credit clause in the draft. An oversight being un-
likely, Ingersoll must have thought that the clause did not com-
mand full faith and credit for the Connecticut act even in the 
absence of a conflict with the law of Pennsylvania. 
Further contemporaneous material not devoid of interest 
comes from the debates in the Virginia Convention on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution. Attacking the proposed establish-
ment of federal courts, Patrick Henry had asked what laws these 
courts would apply in diversity of citizenship cases.214 John Mar-
shall replied: 
" ... the laws of the state where the contract was made. Ac-
cording to those laws, and those only, can it be decided. Is 
this a novelty? No; it is a principle in the jurisprudence of this 
Commonwealth. If a man contracted a debt in the East In-
dies, and it was sued for here, the decision must be consonant 
to the laws of that country. Suppose a contract made in Mary-
land, where the annual interest is at six percentum, and a suit 
instituted for it in Virginia; what interest would be given 
now, without any federal aid? The interest of Maryland most 
certainly; and if the contract had been made in Virginia, and 
suit brought in Maryland, the interest of Virginia must be 
given, without doubt. It is now to be governed by the laws 
of that state where the contract was made. The laws which 
governed the contract at its formation govern it in its deci-
sion."21is 
Apparently no thought had come to Marshall that, in the ex-
ample, Virginia might have to apply the interest rate of Maryland 
because of a duty under the Full Faith and Credit clause of the 
Constitution. 
The language of the Full Faith and Credit clause is, we think, 
broad enough, however, to support the view that non-application 
by the forum of a statute of a sister state, applicable under the law 
of that state, which does not conflict with the law of the forum, 
is a violation of the full faith command for public acts. The op-
position voiced in the Constitutional Convention against the orig-
inal draft was directed against the idea of in this way limiting the 
legislative jurisdiction of the second state but not of barring the 
possibility of frivolo,us non-application of an otherwise applicable 
statute of a sister state. 
214 June 20, 1788. 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN CONVENTION ON THE ADOPTION OF FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 397 (1828). 
215 Id. at 406. 
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The command applies, without implementing law, if the in-
terest of the forum is not adversely affected. And this includes 
situations where a seeming conflict is removed because the conflicts 
rule of the forum refers to the public act of the other state which 
has been invoked. Justice Stone had, it would seem, the latter 
situation in mind when, in Clapper, he said, "the courts of New 
Hampshire, in giving effect to the public policy of that state, 
would be at liberty to apply the Vermont statute and thus, by 
comity, make it the applicable law of New Hampshire."216 
For cases of a real conflict the command does not apply. It was 
left to Congress, if it felt fit, to deal with these situations. They 
are infrequent, limited as they are to cases where the conflicts rule 
of the forum differs from that of the sister state. For, from the 
point of view of constitutional command of full faith, any claim 
of extraterritorial effect for a law, which, in the reversed situation, 
the conflicts rule of the state involved would not admit, may be 
disregarded.217 
We shall not burden this study with another evaluation218 of 
the results achieved by the Supreme Court in applying the com-
mand of full faith and credit to choice of law problems. We side 
with those who think that the new activities of the Court have not 
improved the functioning of the federal system. 
The negative result is not surprising in the light of more than 
six centuries of experience with conflict of laws. Choice of law 
problems are not any easier to solve if they arise in a federal union. 
No practical help has come from the "theory of balancing the 
societal interests of the forum against those of a sister state" seen 
by some in the rulings of the Supreme Court. But the days of 
Clapper seem to be over in fact. As has been observed,210 "further 
216 286 U.S. 145 at 163 (1932). Cf. CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD AND R.EEsE, 
CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, 4th ed., 584 (1957). 
217 On the dissolving of apparent conflicts, see Freund, "Chief Justice Stone and the 
Conflict of Laws," 59 HARV. ,L. REv. 1210 at 1217-1219 (1946). 
218 Statistics are in Justice 'Frankfurter's dissent in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 
414 at 416 (1954). For recent discussions, see Sumner, "The Status of Public Acts in Sister 
States," 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. I (1955); Clark, "Work-Injuries and the Constitution: Carroll 
v. Lanza," 1956 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 320; Hogan, "Constitutional Implications of Work-
men's Compensation and Choice of Law," 7 HASTINGS L. J. 268 (1956); Langschmidt, 
"Choice of Law in Workmen's Compensation," 24 TENN. L. REv. 322 (1956); Stone, 
"The Forum's Policy and the Defense of Faith and Credit to Workmen's Compensation 
Acts," 41 IowA L. REv. 558 (1956); notes: 31 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 104 (1956); 33 TEJC. L. 
REv. 917 (1955); 23 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 515 (1956). 
219 Reese, "Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy," 19 
UNIV. Cm. u:.. R.Ev. 339 at 342 (1952). 
1957] FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 81 
experience with the subject has induced the Court to withdraw 
almost entirely from the field of choice of law." 
National conflicts rules could have great advantages, interna-
tionally and internally. Interstate conflicts would, in a large meas-
ure, have a basis of solution. The decision, under Erie,220 that the 
federal courts must apply local conflicts rules in diversity of citi-
zenship cases,221 has halted development of a national conflicts law 
by the federal courts. The consequence has been growing agita-
tion for legislation under the implementing power granted to 
Congress by the Full Faith and Credit clause. 
V 
We turn to the recent change made by Congress in the legisla-
tion implementing the Full Faith and Credit clause. The Acts of 
1790 and 1804 dealt with authentication both of public acts, and 
of records and judicial proceedings; but only for records and pro-
ceedings did they provide that, if authenticated as prescribed, 
they "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every 
court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the 
courts of the State from which they are taken." 
Materially unchanged, the contents of the acts reappeared in 
the Revised Statutes of 1875, Title: "Judiciary," Chapter: "Evi-
dence," sections 905 and 906, the first dealing with authentication 
of l~gislative acts and proof of judicial proceedings of states etc., 
and the second with authentication of records which are not court 
records. Both had the closing sentence: 
"And the said records and judicial proceedings [906: records 
and exemplifications,], so authenticated, shall have such faith 
and credit given them in every court [906: court and office] 
within the United States as they have by law or usage in the 
courts [906: courts or offices] of the State, [906: Territory, or 
country, as aforesaid,] from which they are taken." 
The two sections became sections 687 and 688, respectively, 
of Title 28: "Judiciary," in Chapter: "Evidence," of the United 
States Code 1926. 
Within the process of revising the United States Code, the 
title 28: "Judiciary," received a thorough overhauling, leading to 
the enactment, by Act of June 25, 1948,222 of the new Federal 
220 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
221 Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. Mccoach, 313 
U.S. 498 (1941). 
222 62 Stat. 947 (1948). 
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Judiciary Code, Title 28 of the United States Code, effective since 
September 1948. With changes, former sections 687 and 688 be-
came sections 1738 and 1739 in Chapter 115: "Evidence; Docu-
mentary," of Title 28: "Judiciary and Judicial Procedure," of the 
United States Code of 1948. 
The procedure applied in ~evising the United States Code 
needs to be recalled. At the direction of the House of Representa-
tives Committee on Revision of the Laws, the revision of the old 
text was undertaken by a staff of the West Publishing Company 
and the Edward Thompson Company, headed by a reviser, aided 
by an Advisory Committee, a committee of the Judicial Confer-
ence, consultants, and counsel of the Committee on Revision of 
the Laws.223 On the bill with the proposed new text introduced in 
the 80th Congress hearings were held before a sub-committee of 
the House Judiciary Committee.224 The chairman of the Commit-
tee on Revision stated that the policy of the revision was avoidance 
wherever possible and whenever possible of the adoption in the re-
vision of what may be described as controversial substantive 
changes of the law.225 In the opinion of the chairman, that policy 
had been very carefully adhered to.226 The chief reviser declared 
that extreme care had been taken to make no changes of substan-
tive law concerning which there might be any controversy.22; Sim-
ilarly, representatives of the advisory committees assured the leg-
islature that care had been taken to make no changes in the exist-
ing laws which would not meet with substantially unanimous ap-
proval, and that departures from the strict letter of existing stat-
utes represented improvements of a non-controversial character.228 
One of the consultants, who testified, pointed at several changes 
he regarded as fairly important, adding that, of course, there will 
be differences of view as to the importance of other changes.229 
Neither he nor any one else mentioned the changes in the provi-
sions derived from the Acts of Congress of 1790 and 1804. Nor 
were these changes mentioned in the debates in Congress. 
223 See Barron, "The Judicial Code 1948 Revision," 8 F.R.D. 439 (1949). 
22,1 Hearings before Subcommittee No. I of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 
1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st sess., March 7, 1947. 
225 Id. at 6 (Eugene J. Keogh, chairman in the 79th Congress of the House Com-
mittee for Revision of the Laws). 
226Ibid. 
22; Id. at 24 (William W. Barron, chief reviser, West Publishing Co.). 
228 E.g., id. at 19 (Hon. Albert B. Maris, chairman of the Committee of Three 
appointed by the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges); id. at 32 (Hon. John B. 
Sanborn, member of the Advisory Committee). 
220 Id. at 27-30 (Prof. James W. Moore). 
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Two changes of interest to this discussion have been made. 
One involves "phraseology" (under the classification employed in 
the Reviser's Notes to the sections).230 Where the old text read: 
"And the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, 
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court with-
in the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts 
... from which they are taken,"231 the new text now reads: " ... 
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States ... as they have by law and usage .... "232 
Apart from the question of style, it would seem to be at least 
doubtful whether adding "full" and speaking of "the same full 
faith and credit" is an improvement. In the decisions on the Act of 
1790, it has been many times said that the issue under the Full 
Faith and Credit clause is not whether the records and proceed-
ings have "full" or "less than full" faith in the court from which 
they come, but that they must be given by the courts in the other 
state "the" faith they have in the original jurisdiction. The addi-
tion of "full" can narrow down the command. To the extent that 
the Full Faith and Credit clause is self-executing, any such nar-
rowing down would have to be discarded as in contravention of 
the command by the Constitution. 
But, of course, the question remains whether the section, in 
fact, "prescribes the effect .... " In Peck v. Williamson, Chief 
Justice Marshall said for the Circuit Court: 
"In our opinion congress have not prescribed the effect [the 
effect of the record]. To suppose that they have is to believe 
that they use the words 'faith and credit' in a sense different 
from that which they have in the clause of the constitution 
upon which they were legislating."233 
Notwithstanding Mills v. Duryee, we think that this is exact. And 
the view now prevailing on the clause, namely, that it is self-ex-
ecuting for judgments, has, to some extent at least, also been in-
fluenced by doubts as to the value attaching to the implementing 
legislation on "the effect." No basis exists for assuming that, in 
1948, Congress wished to disturb these views in one way or an-
other. 
230 Reviser's note: "Changes were made in phraseology." H.Rep. 308, 80th Cong., 
1st sess., AI50 (1947). 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1738, 1739. 
23128 u.s.c. (1940) §§687, 688. 
232 28 u.s.c. (1952) §§1738, 1739. 
233 (C.C. N.C. 1812) 19 Fed. Cas. 85, No. 10,896. See notes 156, 157 supra. 
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The other change which was made in 1948, the Reviser's note 
explains as follows: "At the beginning of the last paragraph, words 
'Such Acts' were substituted for 'And the said.' This follows the 
language of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution."234 Thus 
what read before: "And the said records and judicial proceedings, 
so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit [etc.] ... "235 has 
become: "Such Acts [of the legislature], records and judicial pro-
ceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit [etc.]."236 
On the advice that "this follows the language of the Consti-
tution," the 80th Congress thus has done what the first and the 8th 
Congresses deliberately did not do: legislate on the effect of public 
acts. It was done through the mechanical device of extending what 
has been said for records and proceedings. 
But, in fact, it was not even correct to say that this follows 
the language of the Full Faith and Credit clause, for the clause 
speaks of "public acts," whereas the new text speaks of "acts of 
the legislature.'' "Such," in "Such Acts," namely refers to the first 
part of section 1738, which reads: "The Acts of the legislature of 
any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies 
thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, 
Territory or Possession thereto." "Public Acts" is probably broad-
er than "Acts of the Legislature." Attention should have been 
called to the difference. But this is a mere trifle compared with the 
principal decision to recommend the addition. 
Here was a question, not only not "uncontroversial" but per-
haps the most controversial in the entire interstate conflicts area: 
Is the clause self-executing for public acts? Should implementing 
legislation bring the command to execution? Yet the amendment 
got into the statute book without any discussion, on the reviser's 
word that this "follows the language of the Constitution." Perhaps 
234 H. Rep. 308, 80th Cong., 1st sess., AI50 at 505 (1947), 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1738. 
235 28 u.s.c. (1940) §687. 
236 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1738: "The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or 
Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the 
seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. 
"The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or 
Possession, or copies thereof, shall 1be proved or admitted in other courts within the 
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal 
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court 
that the said attestation is in proper form. 
"Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall 
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Ter-
ritories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Ter-
ritory or Possession from which they are taken." 
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the reviser thought that what was suggested was without legal con-
sequences, that it had no "effect," but in that case he should have 
known that he could not know.237 Perhaps it is not too much to 
say that this episode re.fleets upon the legislative process used. 
Views on the significance of the amendment have by no means 
been uniform. In the 1951 edition of a leading case book on Con-
flict of Laws we read for example: "It would seem that the change 
does extend the effectiveness of the statutory provision to 'Acts,' 
which had not previously been covered by the statute, and that 
this may turn out to be a change of considerable importance."238 
Several years have passed since. Nothing has come from the 
Supreme Court to support the view. The question was raised in a 
dissent but left unanswered by the dissenters.239 Of course, it must 
be considered that even before the change the Court had held the 
Full Faith and Credit clause self-executing for public acts.240 
Inasmuch as experience has shown that everything may hap-
pen in the matter of overruling, it is not excluded that, at a future 
day, a differently-manned Supreme Court will find that, after all, 
without implementing law the command in the clause is ineffec-
237 The change may be "among the many annoying ,because probably meaningless 
but possibly meaningful changes made by the 1948 revisers of the Judicial Code." Hart, 
"The Relations Between State and Federal Law," 54 CoL. L. R.Ev. 489 at 531, n. 160 
(1954). 
238 CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD AND REESE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3d ed., 
76, n. 1 (1951) [Kept unchanged in the fourth, 1957, edition, at p. 77]. Following the above 
quotation is a reference to Goodrich, "Yielding Place to New: Rest versus Motion in 
the Conflict of Laws," 50 CoL. L. R.Ev. 881 at 891 (1950). At the place referred 
to, Judge Goodrich merely says, with a reference to Cheatham, "A Federal Nation and 
Conflict of Laws," 22 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 109 at 114 (1950): "The question posed by 
the language of the new judicial code is this: will the Supreme Court take the opportu-
nity which is apparently offered by this provision to begin an era of national conflict 
of laws rules?" Professor Cheatham had said at the place indicated: " ... The 1948 
amendment to the full faith and credit statute has presented a new basis for possibility 
that national rules of conflict of laws have entirely supplanted the state rules. For that 
amendment included within the statute "public acts," which had been quite deliberately 
left out of the Judiciary Act [sic] of 1790. There is now the same statutory basis at 
least for the Supreme Court taking over the unwelcome burden as to public acts which 
it assumed as to judgments in determining their extra-state effect." But cf. Cheatham, 
"Federal Control of Conflict of Laws," 6 VAND. L. R.Ev. 581 at 585 (1953), where no 
specific statement is made in _this direction. 
239 "Furthermore, the new provision of 28 U.S.C. §1738 cannot be disregarded. In 1948 
Congress for the first time dealt with the full faith and credit effect to be given statutes. 
The absence of such a provision was used by Mr. Justice Stone to buttress the Court's 
opinions both in Alaska Packers, 294 U.S., at 547, and Pacific Employers, 306 U.S., at 
502. Hence, if §1738 has any effect, it would seem to tend toward respecting Missouri's 
legislation. See Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 
19 U. of Cm. L. REv. 339, 343 et seq." Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Carroll v. Lanza, 
349 U.S. 408 at 422. Burton and Harlan, JJ., joined in the dissent. 
240 In Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 at 613-614, n. 16 (1951), Justice Black re• 
marked, speaking for the Court: "In deciding the present appeal ... we have found it 
unnecessary to rely on any changes accomplished by the Judicial Code revision." 
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tive with regard to public acts when the act conflicts with the law 
of the forum. That day, the effectiveness of the 1948 amendment 
for "acts of the legislature" will come to a test. 
Mills v. Duryee will be distinguishable, whatever the thoughts 
on this decision may be. It is one thing to say that "the lights can 
be switched on" for judgments by merely repeating the words in 
the clause, with the result that the doctrine of Walker v. Witter 
is refuted and the principle of the conclusiveness put into effect 
for judgments from sister states. It is quite another thing to assert 
that, through a like primitive "switch," corresponding results can 
be produced for public acts, or acts of the legislature. For no 
"corresponding" results can be thought of in terms of an answer 
to the infinite variety of conflicts problems faced when the act of 
the legislature and the law of the forum clash. A key to automat-
ic solution of choice of law problems has still to be found. A very 
different multiple switch, with a computation machine, would be 
needed to obtain whatever light may be obtainable in this respect. 
The argument will be made that the "intention" of Congress 
was to throw the solution ~f conflicts into the laps of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Mills came up for decision after 
the burning 0f the Capitol in which the bills of the first Con-
gress are said to have perished. We do not wish to think of an 
atomic explosion destroying the sources of the 1948 revision. The 
facts as we have them would seem to rule out any contention that 
the 80th Congress intended just that. Under democratic processes 
the pros and, cons of a constitutional venture of far-reaching con-
s~quences would have required a minimum of discussion. 
While we shall be waiting for these events-we hope no explo-
sion-to happen, thought should be given to repeal of the 1948 
amendment. Currently without practical interest but provoking 
arguments about its possible effect, the amendment detracts from 
the real task which confronts us: the study of what if anything 
can be achieved by proper legislation under the clause or, pos-
sibly, by way of uniform legislation241 to help solve interstate con-
flicts and achieve a more perfect union. 
241 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has post-
poned any consideration of codification of Conflict of Laws until the revision of the 
Restatement has been completed. [1955) HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 127, 131. Simultaneous consideration of pos-
sibilities of uniform legislation and of federal legislation under the Full Faith and 
Credit clause, jointly by the American Law Institute and the Conference, would seem 
to suggest itself after termination of the work of the Institute on the Conflicts volume 
of the Restatement. 
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APPENDIX 
EXTRACTS FROM MADISON'S DEBATES 
Wednesday August 29th. 1787. In Convention 
Art: XVI. taken up. 
87 
[Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and 
to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of 
every other State.] 
Mr. Williamson moved to substitute in place of it, the words of the 
Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did (not) understand 
precisely the meaning of the article. 
Mr. Wilson & Doer. Johnson supposed the meaning to be that Judgments 
in one State should be the ground of actions in other States, & that acts of 
the Legislatures should be included [as they may sometimes serve the like 
purpose as act], for the sake of Acts of insolvency &-
Mr. Pinkney moved to commit art XVI, with the following proposition, 
"To establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respect-
ing the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange" 
Mr. Ghorum was for agreeing to the article, and committing the (propo-
sition.) 
Mr. Madison was for committing both. He wished the Legislature might 
be authorized to provide for the execution of Judgments in other States, 
under such regulations as might be expedient-He thought that this might 
be safely done and was justified by the nature of the Union. 
Mr. Randolph said there was no instance of one nation executing judg-
ments of the Courts of another nation. He moved the following proposition. 
"Whenever the Act of any State, whether Legislative, Executive or Judici-
ary shall be attested & exemplified under the seal thereof, such attestation 
and exemplification, shall be deemed in other States as full proof of the 
existence of that act-and its .operation shall be binding in every other 
State, in all cases to which it may relate, and which are within the cogni-
zance and jurisdiction of the State wherein the said act was done." 
On the question for committing art: XVI with Mr. Pinkney's motion 
N.H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N.J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. 
N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes-9; noes-2] 
The motion of Mr. Randolph was also committed nem: con: 
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to commit also the following proposition on 
the same subject. 
"Full faith ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records, 
and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Legislature shall by 
general laws, determine the proof and effect of such acts, records, and 
proceedings." and it was committed nem: contrad: 
The committee appointed for these references, were Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. 
Randolph, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Wilson, & Mr. Johnson. 
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Saturday Sepr. I. 1787. In Convention. 
Mr. Rutlidge from the Committee to whom were referred sundry propo-
sitions (see Aug: 29), together with art: XVI, reported ... 
and insert the following as Art: XVI-viz 
"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the public acts, 
records, and Judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature 
shall by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, Records, & 
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which Judgments obtained 
in one State shall have in another." 
After receiving these reports The House adjourned to IO oC. on Mon-
day next 
Monday Sepr. 3. 1787. In Convention 
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to amend the Report concerning the respect to 
be paid to Acts Records &c of one State, in other States (see Sepr. I.) by 
striking out "judgments obtained in one State shall have in another" and 
insert the word "thereof" after the word "effect" 
Col: Mason favored the motion, particularly if the "effect" was to be 
restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings 
Mr. Wilson remarked that if the Legislature were not allowed to declare 
the effect the provision would amount to nothing more than what now 
takes place among all Independent Nations. 
Doer. Johnson thought the amendment as worded would authorize the 
Genl. Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State, in 
another State. 
Mr. Randolph considered it as strengthening the general objection agst. 
the plan, that its definition of the powers of the Government was so loose 
as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He was for 
not going farther than the Report, which enables the Legislature to provide 
for the effect of Judgments. 
On the amendment as moved by Mr. Govr. Morris 
Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N.J. ay. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no. 
[ Ayes-6; noes-3.] 
On motion of Mr. Madison, "ought to" was struck out, and "shall" in-
serted; and "shall" between "Legislature" & "by general laws" struck out, 
and "may" inserted, nem: con: 
On the question to agree to the report as amended viz "Full faith & 
credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records & judicial 
proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature may by general laws 
prescribe the manner in which such acts records & proceedings shall be 
proved, and the effect thereof" Agreed to witht. a count of Sts. 
The clause in the Report "To establish uniform laws on the subject 
of Bankruptcies" being taken up. 
2 FARRAND, THE R.EcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, rev. ed., 
pp. 447-489 (1911). 
